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Chapter 1
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis consists of five essays on tax policy in an open economy. Tax policy in an
open economy has in recent years become increasingly relevant. The renewed interest is
due to at least three factors. The first is the European Community's commitment to
create an internal market where all obstacles to free migration of capital and labor will
be removed. The removal of trade barriers may exacerbate differences in national tax
systems and, therefore, raise the important question as to whether the possibility of tax
_ competition prevents countries from following an independent tax policy. The second is
the rapid integration of the world economy and especially the western economies in the
post - war period. This integration has made it clear that substantial differences in tax
systems affects the pattern of international trade. The third concerns the wave of tax
reforms in the eighties, especially the U.S. tax reforms in 1981 and 1986. Despite the
limited mobility of goods and services between the U.S and the rest of the western
world, studies by Bovenberg et al (1989), McLure (1989) and Sinn (1985, 1988, 1989a),
suggest that national tax policy can have adverse effects on world capital markets.
The possible international reallocation of resources induced by openness and differences
in national tax systems has instigated the scientific community to undertake research
in two directions. The first, which we may call the literature on international tax
coordination, is concerned with tax measures that neutralize the adverse effects created
by local tax policy. Researchers in this field have studied the impact of different
jurisdictional principles of taxation (Biehl (1982)), the need for tax harmonization
(Sinn (1989b)), as well as concepts for efficiency and taxpayer equity
(R. Musgrave (1969) and P. Musgrave (1969)). In the tax coordination literature, many
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important contributions have been collected in Cnossen (1987), while Sørensen (1990a)
provides an excellent survey of some of the tax coordination literature.
The second area of research is complementary to the first, and examines the impact of
non-harmonization of taxes when factors of production are internationally mobile. Still
in its early days, this literature spans a wide range of issues. In danger of being
pretentious, it is tempting to give the reader at least a flare of what some of the issues
are by listing three areas of research. Not surprisingly, one issue is fiscal competition
between countries. Hamada (1966) was the first to introduce the concepts of game
theory to the study of international taxation. Recent contributions include Mintz and
Tulkens (1988) and Wildasin (1988), while Wildasin (1986) offers a nice survey of most
of this literature. Another area of research is concerned with how different systems of
capital taxation may affect international allocation of capital. Sinn (1987) and
Boadway and Bruce (1989) are examples of works in this category. A third issue has
been the possibilities of tax arbitrage and tax evasion introduced by openness and
unlimited mobility of capital. Giovannini and Hines (1989) study capital flight and tax
competition, while Giovannini (1989b) and Razin and Sadka (1989) have undertaken
work on tax evasion.
The essays presented in this thesis consists of five separate papers. All except for the
first essay belong to the second category of works as portrayed above. That is, they are
concerned with the impact of differences in national tax systems when taxes are not
harmonized.
The first essay provides an overview of the Norwegian legislative rules governing the
taxation of foreign source income.o The first chapter serves several purposes. First, it
gives a general outline of principles for taxing international income. These principles
0Ault and Bradford (1989) have undertaken a similar study of the U.S. tax system.
and concepts are later used as a f undation for the theoretical papers - assuring that
the modeling takes into account he real world of taxes. The second purpose of the
paper is to provide insight about the Norwegian treatment of foreign source income.
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Such a study can reveal import information regarding the effective rate of tax on
foreign source income and, hence, ive a hint as to whether investment incentives are
distorted in favor of domestic or reign investments. A third objective is to evaluate
the Norwegian tax rules concerni g international capital income to see whether they
meet certain standards of equity d efficiency.1
In addition to examining the tax tion of international capital income, the first essay
offers a brief survey of the rules go erning the taxation of petroleum income. There are
special rules given in the Nor egian tax legislation governing the exploration,
extraction and production of pet oleum as well as businesses related to petroleum
activities on the continental shelf. hese rules have emerged because the participants in
the oil mining business are mos ly large multinational companies thus, making it
important to construct tax rules t t assure a positive rent on natural resources.
Since the effect of national tax policy depends on the degree of openness in the
Norwegian economy, the first essa also incorporates a short survey of the Norwegian
foreign exchange regulations. Late y, several reforms have been undertaken that have
liberalized the foreign exchange m ket and increased the mobility of capital.
The second paper examines the effects of differences in national tax systems on
investment incentives between tw countries. The ever closer integration of western
economies and in particular the co Ing about of the Ee's internal market have lead to
the fear that tax arbitrage and th resulting tax competition would force countries to
lFor an elaborate discussion on the principles of efficiency and taxpayer equity see
SOrensen (1990a, 1990b).
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harmonize their national tax systems. The need for tax harmonization is a complex
issue involving topics such as indirect taxation (R. Musgrave (1969), Whalley (1979),
Berglas (1981)), capital income taxation (Sinn (1987)), and the importance of financial
decisions for the effects of tax policy (Alworth (1988), Hartman (1985)). There exists
several excellent survey articles on the problem of tax harmonization such as Frenkel,
Razin and Sadka (1990), Giovannini (1989a), Sinn (1989a) and Sørensen (1990b).
In particular, the second paper explores the effects of differences in national tax
systems by studying the investment incentives of a multinational firm which
undertakes investments in two countries. It is shown that the imposition of taxes
affects investments between the two countries by increasing or decreasing the rental
rate of capital relative to the pre tax situation and relative to each other. A main result
of the paper - and an international tax paradox - is that differences in national tax
systems may in some cases change the cost of capital in favor of the country with the
highest tax rates and the least generous tax deductible expenditures. This result is
established when personal, corporate and dividend taxes interact with tax deductible
depreciation allowances and is due to distortions of interacting tax parameters when
tax deductible allowances exceed the tax base.
The second essay is closely linked to work done by Sinn (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1990).
Sinn investigated the international allocation effects of alternative systems of capital
income taxation characterized by different degrees of of integration between corporate
and personal taxation as well as tax deductible expenses. As in the second paper, Sinn
finds that interaction between tax parameters may provide counter intuitive results
leading to international tax paradoxes.
The third paper studies optimal taxation of capital when capital is internationally
mobile and can evade taxation with a certain probability. There has been a growing
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public concern over the opportunities offered by tax havens for tax payers to evade
domestic taxation on wealth and income. The most pessimistic conjectures have
claimed that bank secrecy laws and tax havens may deprive a nation of an important
part of its tax base. From a theoretical standpoint the question is how to deal with the
obvious problems of tax evasion when capital freely can cross borders.
Giovannini (1989b) and Razin and Sadka (1989) have studied the welfare effects of
capital mobility and tax evasion. The paper by Giovannini concludes that the welfare
costs of international capital outflows to evade domestic taxation, are larger, the larger
the interest elasticity of domestic investment, relative to the interest elasticity of
savings. Razin and Sadka asked whether the problems posed by tax evasion in an open
economy with capital mobility should impose a country to set a capital export quota.
The answer is affirmative. In another paper, Giovannini (1989a) examined the existing
tax loopholes in Europe and conclude that unless some international agreement can be
reached to abandon these, their presence will seriously hamper the efficiency of the
EC's internal market.
The third essay takes on a different perspective on tax evasion than the works above.
Previous studies have been carried out under the assumption that governments cannot
tax foreign source income. Evidence, however, suggests that governments derive
positive tax revenue from foreign source income. The perspective of the third paper,
therefore, is that tax evasion is a problem of tax enforcement. Accordingly, the main
purpose of the essay is to analyse how taxes should be set optimally when individuals in
a country can save both abroad and domestically. It is assumed that foreign savings
can evade taxation with a certain probability depending on the amount of resources
allocated to tax enforcement by the government. Thus, the allocation of savings is a
decision under uncertainty. From the perspective of the public sector the problem is to
find; (a) how taxes should be set optimally on savings, (b) how much money should be
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allocated to tax enforcement provided that efficiency is the only goal of the nation, and
(c) what the optimallevel of monitoring is.
The fourth paper examines how a linear income tax should be set optimally in an open
economy with internationally mobile labor. So far, the issue of optimal income taxation
has been somewhat neglected in the international taxation literature. A large part of
the modern work done in this area has as its focal point the brain drain from
developing countries and are collected in Bhagwati and Wilson (1989). This strand of
the literature is concerned with the loss of human resources and tax revenue that
developing countries suffer when highly qualified people migrate.
Recently, the rapid integration in the western world and the coming about of the
European Community's internal market have made labor mobility an important issue.
Although it seems reasonable to assume that labor is less mobile than many other
factors of production, labor is not a uniform good. We do know that among some highly
skilled professions such as academics and business managers, labor mobility is quite
high. The EC Commission - having recognized this problem - has found it necessary to
propose coordination of income taxes for two groups of workers within the E.C. The
first group consists of "frontier workers", that is, workers who live in one country and
work in another. These workers are to be taxed in their country of residence with a full
credit for foreign taxes paid. The second group of workers are people who spend parts
of the year abroad working while the rest of the time is spent in their home country.
According to the Commission, these workers are to be taxed in the source country on
equal terms to that of their home country. Ulph (1987) has analyzed the requirements
for efficient taxation of "frontier workers". Ulph's analysis demonstrates that the
Commission's proposal guarantees an efficient allocation of labor provided that workers
are indifferent between working in either country, transport costs are tax deductible, no
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pay-roll taxes are collected by the country of employment, and output markets are
competitive.
The fourth paper differs from previous models in that it constructs a model where
individuals can choose between countries based on preferences for leisure and
consumption where to work. The structure of the model, therefore, is similar to
standard models of labor supply. A special feature of the model is that working hours
are fixed and different across countries. The fixity of working hours may be seen as
determined by institutional constraints such as labor unions. Within this setting the
paper formulates a social welfare function which takes into account the problem of
migration. This is done by maximizing a social welfare function where the welfare
weight depends on time spent domestically. The question answered by the social
planner is how a linear income tax should be set optimally when residents of a nation
freely can migrate. The tax policy instruments at hand is a linear income tax, a
uniform lump sum transfer and a social insurance transfer. The social insurance
transfer differ from the lump sum transfer by depending on time spent in the home
country and is, therefore, distortionary. From an equity point of view, the
redistributive impact of the social insurance transfer is not clear. If ability is positively
correlated to time spent domestically, then, the social insurance transfer is a poor
redistributive device. Not unexpected, the analysis is inconclusive as to which form of
transfer is the best redistributive device. Moreover, compared to studies in a closed
economy, the analysis leads to no definite result as to the level of taxation. The latter
can be explained by the fact that the solution to the maximization problem is not
explicit.
The fifth paper explores how the tax deduction scheme as opposed to the tax credit
scheme affects the behavior of a multinational firm. Previous works have compared the
tax credit and the tax deduction scheme from a world perspective to see which system
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is preferred (P. Musgrave (1969), Hamada (1966) and Bond and Samuelson (1989)).
Since the perspective of nations is adopted in these studies, they are all carried out
under the conventional assumption that the tax deduction system introduces an
anti-trade bias because traded capital is subjected to double taxation.
The objective of the fifth paper is twofold. The first is to characterize the optimal
strategy of the firm when faced with the two tax schemes and examine whether the tax
deduction scheme induces the firm to export less goods than does the tax credit
scheme. The second is to examine the effects of the tax credit and the tax deduction
scheme from the perspective of a nation and, to determine whether firms respond
differently to tax policy under the two tax schemes.
The paper uses a simple model based on Horst (1977) of a monopolistic firm selling to
two different countries simultaneously to examine the effects of the two tax schernes.s
The analysis demonstrates that the double taxation implied by the tax deduction
scheme does not necessarily induce the firm to export less goods than does the tax
credit scheme. Moreover, the impact of tax policy on the transfer pricing behavior of
the firm differs under the two tax systems and the tax deduction system induces a
fiscal externality on a country. In particular, if a government chooses the tax deduction
scheme, then, it cannot influence the behavior of the firm; if it chooses the tax credit
scheme, its tax policy has real effects. In either case - when tax policy by either
government has real effects - these are shown to depend on the first order condition for
trade between the parent firm and its foreign subsidiary. Lacking this knowledge, the
government cannot identify the sign or magnitude of the effects of its policy. In
contrast, trade policy by the foreign country has an unambiguous impact on the
transfer pricing behavior of the firm and, therefore, gives the foreign country the upper
hand in any tax setting game irrespective of tax scheme in place.
2For survey articles in this area see for example Eden (1989) and Kopits (1976).
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To summarize, the objective of this thesis is to shed some light on the implications of
differences in national tax policies in an open economy. Each essay is a distinct and
separate piece of work. If there is a common feature present in all four theoretical
essays, it is the assumption that goods, services, labor and capital are mobile across
borders. Although perfect mobility still is fiction, limited mobility of goods and services
are not. Moreover, if the efforts undertaken by some countries to integrate their
economies are proven successful, fiction may soon become reality.
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Chapter2
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS:
THE NORWEGIAN TAX SYSTEM*
Abstract
This paper describes the basic Norwegian legislative rules governing the taxation of
foreign source income and explores the impact on efficiency-and equity that these rules
imply. Particular attention is paid to examine whether income derived in countries
with which a tax treatyexists carry different effective rates of tax compared to income
derived in non-treaty countries. A short survey is also given of the Norwegian foreign
exchange regulations and the taxation of petroleum income.
*1 am indebted to Arthur J. Brudvik and an anonymous reviewer at the Ministry of Finance for
extremely useful comments. Comments on an earlier draft from Kåre P. Hagen, Jan I.Haaland,
Agnar Sandmo, Guenther G. Schulze and Eirik Wærness are gratefully appreciated.
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TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS:
THE NORWEGIAN TAX SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION
The coming about of the European Community's intergrated market of 1992 has lead
to a feverish activity among companies in Europe to gain strategic footholds before the
curtain of regulations is lifted. These preparations are motivated by the change in the
competitive environment implied by 1993. According to the plan, on new year's day
1993, all physical border controls will be lifted and labor and capital will be completely
free to migrate. The new European market, if successful, will provide easy access to any
market within the European Community. In the absence of customs and tariff barriers,
and with factors of production free to move, the differences between national tax
systems become increasingly important. The country with the most favorable tax rules
will gain a competitive advantage that may influence commodity trade, capital
movements, labor migration, and the location decision of the firm.
Several countries have recognized that the increasing integration of markets may pose
serious problems for the independence of national tax rules. The fear of tax competition
has forced authorities in different countries to have a closer look at their taxation of
international capital flows. The Norwegian economy is among Europe's most open,
highly dependent upon access to foreign markets. It is, therefore, important to
understand how the Norwegian legislation treats international capital income flows. A
biased national tax system, which through tax considerations affects the choice of a
domestic taxpayer between foreign or domestic investment, may have important effects
on the welfare of the nation.
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The purpose of this paper is to describe and examine the basic Norwegian tax rules
that govern the taxation of international income, and to explore the incentives they
provide.' The paper must not be conceived as a complete description of the legislation in
this area, rather, it is an attempt to describe the main rules under which international
income is being taxed.
It should be noted at the outset, that the Norwegian legal rules that govern the
taxation of international transactions are quite complicated and difficult to survey.
Niels Bohr, the famous danish physicist, who had rules for writing, would have found in
the Norwegian legislation that his third rule was violated.t Bohr's third rule says: Il you
shall not write more clearly than you can think ''. Most of the rules, written in a period
committed to nation building rather than integration, seem to have emerged from an
ad hoc process instead of a grand strategy. The myriad of rules and exemptions in the
treatment of international income is, therefore, a clear evidence of this part of the
legislative process being a stepchild. In today'S competitive environment it would be a
serious error to view the choice of tax policy as made in an international vacuum.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the jurisdictional principles
governing the Norwegian tax system. Section 3 and 4 examines how foreign source
income is taxed when derived in countries with which no double taxation tax treaty yet
exists and in countries with which a tax treaty exists. The taxation of petroleum
income is a distinct entity in the legislation, governed by different principles and rules,
and these are described in section 5. The Norwegian foreign exchange regulations are
surveyed in section 6, and section 7 offers a summary and a critical evaluation of the
Norwegian tax system.
lA similar study of the U.S. tax system has been undertaken by Ault and Bradford (1989).
2Dyson (1988).
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2. JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES 3
The Norwegian tax system is based on the residence principle. The residence principle
means that a Norwegian person is subject to tax on a worldwide basis. As a
consequence, income derived abroad is subject to tax in Norway regardless of whether
it also has been taxed in the source country. The use of the residence principle is
modified by internallegislation and tax treaties in cases where double taxation-occurs,
and we will later examine how these affect the taxation of international income. In the
next section we will concentrate our effort on examining how the legislation defines a
Norwegian person.
Taxation ofNof1JJegian Persons
Individuals. An individual is considered a Norwegian person if she has resided in
Norway for six months regardless of whether the purpose of stay is temporary or not.
Citizenship does not matter, only the period of residency. A Norwegian person who
temporarily resides abroad, is stillliable to pay tax in Norway on all her income for up
to four years. If a temporary stay has lasted for one year, the tax liability to Norway
ceases immediately if it can be proved that taxes are paid to the foreign country as if
one was a resident of that country. In case of emigration, the tax liability to Norway
ceases to exist when leaving Norway.
Corporations. Corporations are Norwegian tax units if they are situated in Norway or if
they are managed from Norway. Thus, Norwegian owned foreign share holding
companies are not subject to tax in Norway since they are regarded as independent
3The legal rules and principles of taxation that are stated in the following sections are based on
many sources. Among the most important have been the Norwegian tax legislation, especially the
articles 15, 17, 22, 23, 26, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 54. Another major source has been
A.J. Brudvik (1991).
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entities not managed from Norway. In contrast, a Norwegian company which has a
foreign branch, must pay taxes in Norway on the income from the branch because the
branch is considered to be a part of the Norwegian firm.
The use of the residency principle in the Norwegian legislation connects a person's
income and wealth to the taxing jurisdiction. There is one important exception to this
rule in the legislation. Property with belonging movable assets abroad are exempted
from wealth taxation. Income derived from such properties is, of course, taxable. The
exemption of certain types of wealth from the wealth tax base has important
consequences for the deductibility of debt and interest expenses against wealth and
income in Norway. Wealth kept abroad limits the allowed deductions and the
legislation uses a ratio rule to calculate these. Debt and interest expenses can only be
deducted against wealth and income in Norway in proportion to the share of total
wealth kept in Norway. For example, a Norwegian person who keeps 70 percent of his
wealth abroad, can deduct 30 percent of his debt and interest expenses against wealth
and income in Norway. It does not matter where the debt and interest expenses are
accumulated, nor whether income earned abroad is zero.
Taxation o (Foreigners
According to the tax legislation, a foreigner is a person who resides for less than six
months in Norway and in addition, is not a Norwegian person+, Below we will examine
the taxation of foreign individuals and corporations.
Individuals. Foreigners deriving wage income in Norway are subject to a modified
version of the source principle. Under pure source taxation, income is taxed in the
country where it is derived. According to the Norwegian tax legislation, a foreigner who
4The reservation "and in addition, is not a Norwegian person" stems from the rule mentioned
previously which says that a Norwegian person who resides abroad temporarily, is still considered a
Norwegian person for up to a maximum of four years.
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has resided in Norway, is subject to tax on income that has been earned and made
available for disbursement during the period of stay. As a consequence, salary earned in
Norway but not due until after the foreigner has left the country is not taxable in
Norway. Similarly, salary earned abroad which was received after the individual moved
to Norway is not taxable. Hence, income must be both earned and made available
during stay before it becomes taxable in Norway.
Corporations. Foreign corporations participating in trade or business activities situated
in Norway or managing business activities in a foreign country from Norway are
subject to tax in Norway on such activities. Thus, a foreign owned company which is
either situated in Norway or managed from Norway are taxable in Norway.
Income From Other Sources. Foreigners are subject to wealth and income taxation on
chattel and real estate situated in Norway. The taxation of chattel has become
increasingly important due to the use of leasing across countries, and prevents tax
arbitrage by precluding that foreigners lease production equipment to a Norwegian
person and earn tax free income.
Foreigners deriving interest income in Norway are not subject to tax in Norway unless
such income is part of their regular business activity. For example, a foreign bank
established in Norway is subject to tax on all interest income while a foreigner's
interest income from her Norwegian savings account is not taxable.
Sale of Shares. Foreigners selling shares in Norwegian companies are in general not
subject to tax on capital gains in Norway. There are two exceptions to this rule. First,
if shares owned as part of the seller's business activity is sold, the gain is subject to
taxation. Second, foreigners selling a significant part of the share holding capital of a
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firm becomes subject to tax on the gain. In section 3 we will elaborate on the rules
governing the taxation of significant sales of shares.
Dividends. Dividends received from Norwegian companies are imposed a withholding
tax in Norway. The tax rate is 25 percent, but tax treaties can regulate the tax rate.
The ReliefofDov.ble Taxation
Where several countries impose both residence and source based taxation, the same
income stream may be taxed more than once. For example, if a Norwegian firm has a
branch in England, both Norway as the country of residence, and England as the
country of source, will assert the right to tax the branch income. The Norwegian
attitude towards double taxation is that the same income stream should not be taxed
twice. To help overcome the problem of double taxation, alleviation is given through
internal legislative rules, tax treaties and by approval of the Ministry of Finance. The
Norwegian policy to deal with double taxation, however, does not have as a goal that
the tax burden imposed on foreign and domestic investments should be equal. As a
consequence, the policy objective of equity which seem to apply for domestically earned
income, is not present in the treatment of foreign versus domestic income. Not only
does this treatment discriminate between the two income categories, but it may also
distort investment incentives in favor of the country with the most generous tax
system. In section 7 we will examine this problem in greater detail.
It is a general interpretation of the Norwegian tax legislation that in cases where a tax
treaty implies a higher tax burden than internal tax rules, the rules which give the
lowest tax burden should be applied. In the following we will focus on how income is
taxed when derived in countries with which no double taxation treaty yet exists.
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9. TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME
WHEN NO TAX TREATY APPLIES
A Norwegian person who derives income in a non - treaty country, is liable to pay tax
in Norway on all foreign source income regardless of whether the income has also been
taxed in the source country. The relief of double taxation is provided by using rules
given in the tax legislation or by applying for reduction or exemption of Norwegian tax
liability to the Ministry of Finance. More specifically, relief from double taxation is
given by the following two policies:
Tax Deduction. According to legislative rules, a Norwegian person can deduct foreign
income taxes against income taxable in Norway. The deduction method clearly does
not provide a full relief from foreign taxes paid, and involves some amount of double
taxation which can be seen by considering the following example.
Suppose a Norwegian corporation solely derives income from abroad. At first, the
income is taxed abroad at the foreign rate. Then, foreign taxes paid are deducted
against the foreign income, and the remaining amount is taxed in Norway. Hence, the
part of the income which is taxable in Norway is taxed both abroad and at home
without any relief from double taxation. The element of double taxation that is
incurred by the use of the deduction method implies that domestic and foreign
investments carry different effective rates of tax.
Tax Credit. The second way to reduce the burden of double taxation is to credit foreign
income taxes imposed on foreign source income against otherwise applicable Norwegian
tax liability. The tax credit depends upon the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Once the right to credit is given it normally lasts for three consecutive years. The
magnitude of the tax credit, however, is limited to the amount of tax arising from the
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Norwegian taxation of the foreign source income. In other words, if the foreign income
tax exceed the Norwegian tax liability, the Ministry of Finance does not allow the
overshooting part to be carried forward to the next year. Moreover, the Ministry of
Finance only gives credit against pure profits taxes. Indirect taxes and duties cannot be
credited. When calculating the Norwegian tax falling on the foreign source income,
interest expenses must be portioned between the foreign source income and the
domestic income. The rule given by the Ministry of Finance is that interest expenses
must be distributed in proportion to income earned abroad and at home. Note that in
this case the general rule that interest expenses should be distributed in proportion to
wealth kept abroad and at home is exempted. In effect, the use of a limited tax credit
means that the taxpayer pays the higher of the foreign and the Norwegian tax rate.
In the following we will outline the rules for taxation of business income, dividends and
personal income. The treatment of these income categories under tax treaties is
postponed to chapter 4.
Taxation o(Business Income
There are two different ways of dealing with foreign source income depending on
whether the foreign operations are undertaken by a foreign subsidiary (which is a
Norwegian owned share holding corporation), or by a branch (which is merely an
extension of the Norwegian firm and not regarded as a separate entity).
Foreign Branch Income. If a Norwegian company carries out business abroad through a
branch, any income generated from the branch is subject to tax in Norway and
expenditures incurred are deductible against taxable income in Norway. To reduce the
burden of overall taxation, the parent company can apply to the Ministry of Finance to
credit foreign taxes paid by the branch against the Norwegian tax liability falling on
the income of the branch. According to the Ministry of Finance, credit is granted in
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most cases. If for some reason the branch should not be allowed a limited credit, the
Norwegian firm can by using legislative rules, deduct foreign taxes paid against taxable
income.
Foreign Subsidiary. If operations abroad are undertaken by a foreign subsidiary which
is a distinct and separate entity, income earned will not be taxable in Norway and
expenditures not deductible. Repatriated dividends, however, are taxable. We will in a
later section of this chapter study how foreign source dividends are taxed.
The Norwegian tax legislation allows in some cases the Norwegian parent company and
its foreign subsidiary to be taxed in Norway as if they were a single Norwegian entity.
Such treatment is called direct taxation, and has the effect that profits or losses on the
foreign subsidiary's hand are added to the income of the Norwegian company. A
company which uses the method of direct taxation must cancel all transactions between
the parent and the subsidiary which have reduced the taxable income of the parent.
The legal rules governing direct taxation states that if operations abroad are
undertaken by a subsidiary, the parent firm and its foreign subsidiary can apply to the
Ministry of Finance to be taxed according to the rules of direct taxation. Approval of
direct taxation depends upon two requirements being fulfilled at the same time. First,
there must be no tax treaty in place between Norway and the country where the
foreign firm is situated. Second, a maximum of 10 Norwegian persons must own at least
95 percent of the share holding capital in the foreign firm. As regarding to the latter
requirement, approval is contingent upon the shares having been acquired due to
common business interests among the share holders. The practice of the Ministry of
Finance is to approve all applications that satisfy the required conditions. An approval
is in most cases limited in time to two or three consecutive years whereby a new
application must be submitted. When direct taxation is granted, relief from double
-27-
taxation is given by either applying for a limited tax credit or by deducting foreign
taxes against taxable income in Norway.
Direct taxation has also been used by the tax authorities as a "look through" rule in
cases where Norwegian ship owners register their ships in foreign countries. There are
two requirements that must be satisfied in such cases. First, the registration of the
foreign firm must not imply any real responsibility in the foreign country, that is, the
foreign subsidiary is merelya mailbox company. Second, at least 50 percent of the
foreign subsidiary's share holding capital is owned by Norwegian persons.
Taxation o(Dividends
Norwegian owned foreign companies can defer the taxation of business income until it
is repatriated in the form of dividends. Dividends from foreign sources are subject to
both the state tax (27,8%), the municipal tax (21%) and the common tax (2%). In
contrast, dividends from domestic sources are subject only to the state tax. Dividends
arising abroad are in almost all cases taxed in the country of source as well as in the
country where the recipient resides. There are three ways in which the double taxation
of dividends is relieved in the Norwegian tax system:
Tax Deduction. As in the case of business income, a Norwegian person has the right
through legislative rules, to deduct foreign dividend taxes paid against income taxable
in Norway. Following the discussion above, this method implies double taxation and
that foreign and domestic dividends carry different effective rates of tax.
Tax Credit. The taxpayer can apply to the Ministry of Finance to credit foreign
dividend taxes against the otherwise applicable Norwegian tax on the foreign dividends.
The tax credit cannot exceed the Norwegian tax liability on dividends.
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Adjusted Tax Exemption. A Norwegian parent which receives dividends from a foreign
subsidiary, can apply to the Ministry of Finance to be exempted from the municipal
tax and the state tax. Such exemption is given if the total tax burden on the parent
and the subsidiary's hand is higher than if the subsidiary was a Norwegian firm. When
evaluating the total tax burden, the Ministry of Finance calculates the foreign tax on
both business income and dividends. In pratice the ministry reduces the tax until the
total corporate tax becomes 50.8 percent which is the statutory corporate tax rate in
Norway.s If the corporation is subject to direct taxation, the firm cannot apply for an
exemption. Exemption from dividend taxation can be given regardless of whether a tax
treatyexists or not. Note that adjusted tax exemption - as it is practiced in Norway -
implies that the firm faces the same effective rate of tax on domestic and foreign
investments.
Taxation o(Personal Income
A Norwegian person who derives personal income abroad, can credit foreign taxes paid
against the Norwegian tax liability on the foreign source income. The credit cannot
exceed the Norwegian tax.
The Taxation o(Capital Gains (rom the Sale o(Shares
A Norwegian person selling shares in a foreign company is exempted from tax on all
such sales if she has owned the shares for more than three years. If shares are sold
before the three year exemption rule applies, the gain is taxed at a rate of 40 percent."
The gain from the sale of shares is calculated as the difference between the purchase
price and the sale price. If some shares are sold at a loss and others with a gain, the tax
liability is calculated on the basis of the net gain. These rules are valid as long as the
5There is no rule in the tax legislation that grants a tax rate of 50,8 percent, but normally this rate
is used.
6Lossesfrom the sale of shares are tax deductible.
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seller is not taxed according to the rules for a significant sale of shares or sells shares as
part of her business activity.
A significant sale of shares is defined as the sale of 45 percent or more of the total share
holding capital in an enterprise. If the buyer, however, acquires 50 percent or more of
the shares or the majority of the votes, the seller will be taxed according to the rules of
significant sale of shares if she sold only 30 percent of the shares. If a group of people
sell shares in such quantities that either the 45 or the 30 percent rute applies, each
seller can be taxed according to the rules for significant sale of shares irrespective of the
amount sold by each individual. For the latter rule to be valid, the seller must be
aware of that a transfer of ownership is in the process.
There are two ways to calculate the gain from a significant sale of shares depending on
whether the firm whose shares are sold, is a Norwegian company or a foreign company.
The gain from sale of shares in foreign firms is calculated as the difference between
purchase price and sale price. If some shares are sold with a gain and others with a loss,
only the net gain is taxable. For the sale of shares in a Norwegian firm, the gain can
either be calculated as above or as if the firm sold assets corresponding to the number
of shares being sold minus the purchase price. When shares in a Norwegian company
are sold, the seller can choose which of these methods she wants to be taxed according
to.
Foreigners selling Norwegian shares are not taxed on such gains unless they are selling
shares owned as part of their business activity or deemed as a significant sale of shares.
Wealth Taxation ofShares
The rules for taxation of wealth in connection with shares are rather peculiar because
there are different rules for the taxation of wealth on foreign and domestic shares.
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Norwegian share holding companies are not subject to tax on wealth from their holding
of domestic shares, while individuals are subject to tax on wealth from domestic shares.
In contrast, both corporations and individuals are subject to wealth taxation on their
holding of foreign shares. As a consequence, firms incur higher costs by holding foreign
shares versus domestic shares, and individuals incur a higher tax burden than firms by
holding domestic shares.
Trans (er Pricing
It is a principle governing the Norwegian taxation of international income that income
arising out of transactions between related parties, such as a parent company and its
subsidiary, must be determined as if the parties were not related. This "arm's length"
principle applies whether a tax treatyexists or not.
The purpose of transfer pricing is to shift income from high to low tax countries.
Transfer pricing is in practice very difficult to prove since prices charged between a
parent firm and its foreign subsidiary often cannot be compared to market prices. To
convict someone for transfer pricing behavior, the burden of proof lies on the tax
authorities when dealing with Norwegian persons. In contrast, if the taxpayer is a
foreigner, the burden on proof lies on the foreigner. If a firm is found guilty of transfer
pricing, its income will be increased until it reaches a level comparable to that had
prices been established in a market.
J. TAX TREATIES
The taxation of international income when a tax treatyapplies, is quite different from
that when no treatyexists since the purpose of a treaty is to avoid that the same
income stream is taxed twice. Norway has signed tax treaties with 59 countries,
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including all of Europe except Albania. These treaties are bilateral except for the
treaty between the Nordic countries, which establishes general rules for the taxation of
capital flows between the Nordic countries.
Most of the treaties that Norway has signed are in general based on the OECD's Model
Double Taxation Convention of 1963 (MDTC) except for some treaties with developing
countries." Developing countries are allowed a larger tax base for international income
than what is generally recommended in the MDTC.
The purpose of the MDTC is to avoid that the same income stream is taxed twice, first
at source, and then in the country where the recipient reside. To avoid double taxation,
therefore, either the source country or the country of residence must give up its right to
tax international income. When the source country gives up its right to tax income
originating within its jurisdiction, it does so by exempting it from taxation. In
contrast, the country of residence can apply two general policies to alleviate double
taxation; tax exemption or tax crediting.
The Exemption Method. The exemption method is as the name indicates, based on
exempting income which has already been taxed abroad from taxation in Norway.
There are two versions of this method. The first version, called the full exemption
method, exempts foreign source income that has been taxed abroad from taxation in
Norway. The second version, called exemption with progression, also exempts income
taxed abroad from taxation, but foreign source income is included in the tax base and,
therefore, has a progression effect on domestic income. In the latter case the
progression effect only occurs for personal income since the statutory corporate tax rate
is flat at 50.8 percent. The tax treaties which Norway has signed are all based on the
7The OECD' s Model Double Taxation Convention was revised in 1977.
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use of the exemption method with progression. The Ministry of Finance, however, has
decided to suspend the use of this method and, instead, to apply the full exemption
method.
Tax Credit. The credit method is the same as outlined above and is employed in
connection with foreign source dividends and in some cases interest income. The reader
is referred to the discussion in section 3 for the impact of using a limited tax credit.
Since most of the tax treaties are based on the advice of the Double convention, it is
useful to examine how the Double Taxation Convention recommends that different
income categories are to be taxed. In the next section we will do exactly that.
Taxation o(Business Pro fits
Foreign Subsidiary. A Norwegian owned foreign share holding company is subject to
tax in the state where it is located. In a later section in this chapter we will deal with
the taxation of repatriated dividends.
Foreign Branch. The profits of a Norwegian enterprise are taxable only in Norway
unless it carries on business in a foreign country through a permanent establishment
situated therein. The term permanent establishment is defined in the Double Taxation
Convention as a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is
partly or wholly carried on. The foreign country can only tax the profits which can be
attributed to the permanent establishment
Taxable profits of a permanent establishment are the profits which the permanent
establishment might be expected to make if it was a distinct and separate enterprise
engaged in the same or similar activities. In calculating the true profits of a permanent
establishment, expenses can be deducted which are incurred for the purposes of the
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permanent establishment including overhead costs and general administrative expenses.
To prevent transfer pricing, Norwegian tax authorities have the right to alter the size
of such transfer prices if they can prove that the transfer prices deviate from market
prices.
Taxation ofDividends
According to the Model Double Taxation Convention, dividends paid by a company
which is resident of one country to some taxpayer in another country may be taxed in
both countries. The MDTC restricts the size of the tax on dividends that the source
country can impose. The withholding tax cannot exceed 5 percent of the gross amount
of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company which holds directly at least 25
percent of the capital of the company paying the dividends. In all other cases the rate
is 15 percent.
The general rule governing the taxation of dividends in tax treaties between Norway
and other countries is that both countries are allowed to tax such income. Norway has
reserved the right to impose a withholding tax on dividends of 15 percent irrespective
of how many shares the beneficial recipient holds. In some treaties with developing
countries, the withholding tax that the developing country is allowed to impose exceeds
the rate established by the MDTC. The highest withholding tax in such cases is 25
percent. To alleviate the double taxation of dividends the credit method is applied.
Taxation 1lfPersonal Income
The guiding principle governing the taxation of salaries and wages is that income is
only taxable in the state where the recipient resides unless the actual work has been
carried out in another state. In the latter case income is taxable in the contracting
state. If both the employer and the employee reside in another state than the one where
the work is carried out, the salary is taxable in the state where the worker resides if the
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stay does not exceed 183 days in the fiscal year of the foreign country. Pensions are
taxable in the country of residence. Pensions and remunerations paid as part of social
welfare programs are taxable only in the state which pays these provisions.
Taxation o(Interest Income
Interest income arising in a foreign country and paid to a Norwegian person may be
taxed at source as well as in Norway. In most treaties interest income paid to
Norwegian persons is taxed twice. Double taxation, however, is alleviated by the credit
method as for dividends. The Double Taxation Convention recommends that
withholding taxes for interest income should not exceed 10 percent. It is worth noting
that Norwegian tax authorities do not levy a withholding tax on interest paid to
foreigners. The reason is that there is no legal provision upon which such taxation can
be based.
Royalties
Royalties arising in a foreign country and paid to a Norwegian person are only taxable
in Norway. Developing countries, however, are allowed to tax royalties. In such cases
the Ministry of Finance permits the use of a limited credit for foreign taxes paid. In the
case of a Norwegian parent company receiving either royalties or interest income from
a foreign subsidiary, the size of these transfers can be reduced if they exceed the market
value of such services.
Taxation o(Capital Gains
The rules governing the taxation of capital gains are not uniform across all treaty
countries. The rules below must, therefore, not be perceived as generally valid. Income
derived by Norwegian persons from the sale of immovable property situated abroad is
only taxed in the foreign country. Expenses which have occurred in connection with the
sale of such property cannot be deducted against income in Norway. The sale of
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movable assets is in general taxable in Norway. In some treaties with developing
countries the host country is allowed to tax the gain from such sales.
The gain from the sale of shares can only be taxed in the state where the seller resides.
Thus, foreigners selling shares of Norwegian companies are not subject to tax on the
gain except for in cases where they are selling shares owned as part of their regular
business activity or if the sale is a significant sale of shares.
5. TAXATION OF PETROLEUM INCOME
There are special rules given in the Norwegian tax legislation governing the
exploration, extraction and production of petroleum and businesses related to
petroleum activities on the continental shelf. The term petroleum contains mineraloils,
related hydro carbons and gases, and other minerals which are extracted in connection
with oil mining.
The Jurisdictional Principle
In contrast to the regular legislation the jurisdictional basis to tax is the source
principle. The application of source based taxation implies that any person or
corporation who derives income from petroleum mining on the continental shelf is
subject to tax in Norway. There is, however, one limitation to the use of the source
principle and that is in connection with the taxation of foreigners from countries which
Norway has signed tax treaties with. In most treaties, profits from foreign persons are
taxable in Norway only if they carryon business through a permanent establishment
situated in Norway. In older tax treaties, which do not explicitly mention the
continental shelf, the meaning of the term permanent establishment is not well defined
in connection with petroleum exploration. It is, therefore, an unsolved question which
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country is the taxing jurisdiction in such casess. New treaties have special rules that
either secure the Norwegian right to tax activities on the continental shelf avoiding the
problem of defining a permanent establishment, or explicitly leaves out the continental
shelf, thereby guaranteeing Norway as the taxing jurisdiction.
Taxation oflncome and Wealth
According to the legislation, both income and wealth derived from petroleum or
petroleum related activities are taxable. Since there are no municipalities in the North
Sea, the taxpayer must pay the regular state tax as given in the legislation (27,8
percent for share holding companies) and an additional tax of 23 percent to the
government which corresponds to the total of the municipal and the common tax. In
addition, there is a special tax of 30 percent on income from the extraction of oil,
pipeline transportation and income related to these activities. The special tax accrues
on income without the deduction for dividends in the case of share holding companies.
There are some other special expenses which cannot be deducted from taxable income,
but in the present context it hardly seems worth while to go into detail.? A very
particular feature of the special tax is that it does only apply to taxable income after
the deduction of a production/extraction allowance, which is independent of the
investment costs of the tax-payer. At present, the allowance constitutes 15 percent of
gross production value for oil fields which were approved by the Ministry of Oil after
1.11986.1°
The Norm Price System
The problem of transfer pricing is thoroughly dealt with in the petroleum tax act
through the norm price system. The guiding principle behind the norm price system is
80.E. Klingenberg (1977).
9Interested readers are refferred to A.J .Brudvik (1991) Skatterett for næringsdrivende, p. 392.
10For more details regarding the allowance on older oil fields see A.J .Brudvik (1991) p. 408.
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that taxable income should be determined on the basis of price setting in a competi tive
market with no related parties. A special council, called the Petroleum Council,
determines how gross income and the value of petroleum stocks should be evaluated. As
opposed to the regular legislation where the burden of proof in cases of transfer pricing
lies on the authorithies, the petroleum tax act gives rules for income determination. An
example is illustrating. A firm cannot extend the period of credit for purchases beyond
30 days. If the 30 days rule is violated, the purchase price is increased by 0,036 percent
per day exceeding the legal credit period. Rules like this restricts the possibility of
transfer pricing behavior except for in cases where there are loopholes in the law. In
such cases the authorities will have to proof that transfer pricing has occurred.
To further avoid that parent and sister companies try to lower taxable income, deficits
derived abroad cannot be deducted against petroleum or petroleum related income.
Moreover, deficits derived in connection with other business activities subject to
Norwegian taxation, can only be deducted with one half. The other half must be
deducted against mainland activities which falls outside the jurisdiction of the
petroleum tax act.
6. FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS 11
The differences in national tax rates provide incentives for economic agents to localize
their activities where the after tax rate of return is highest. The place of residence and
even citizenship are choice variables. It seems reasonable to assume that commodity
trade and capital movements are the most responsive factors to differences in national
tax systems, and that corporations are more responsive than individuals. In general, if
llFor a survey of the foreign exchange rules see also Kari Olsen (1990).
-38-
the after tax rate of return on investments abroad is higher than at home, we should at
least in the long run observe an outflow of capital from Norway.
Previously, foreign exchange regulations were heavily regulated, thus, preventing the
outflow and inflow of capital to Norway. The Central Bank (Norges Bank) removed
most of the new regulations in spring 1990, and new rules entered into force on July 1
1990. The most important new rules are described below.
Direct Investments
Norwegian companies and individuals are free to make foreign direct investments
without a foreign exchange license. Purchases and sales of shares, however, must be
carried out by a Norwegian broker. The Central Bank may waive the stockbroker
requirement upon application.
Port folio Investments
The new rules allow all Norwegian persons to freely undertake any sale or purchase of
shares or money market lnstruments/certiflcates denominated in foreign currency.
Moreover, all quantity regulations have been removed. Foreigners are correspondingly
allowed to purchase and sell Norwegian money market instruments. The only
restriction left behind concerns the purchase and sale of foreign securities, bonds and
certificates. These transactions must be effectuated by a Norwegian broker. Residents
may open accounts in foreign banks but must notify the Central Bank.
Municipal Sector
According to the new legislation the municipal sector is prohibited from undertaking
lending or borrowing transactions in foreign currency. Furthermore, any operation
exposing the sector to a notable degree of foreign exchange risk is prohibited.
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Rules for Paument Channels
Foreign exchange banks in Norway are under the new rules reserved the sole right to
engage in foreign currency transactions. All transactions must be reported to the
Central Bank. The information given to the Central Bank must contain the customer's
residency as well as identity. There are no restrictions on the amount of money that
can be channeled inwards or outwards of physical means of payment. However, any
person who upon departure or entry carry more than the corresponding amount of
NOK. 25 000, must declare the amount through the custom authorities. Residents can
make payments to residents in foreign currency, but such transactions can only be
effected through foreign exchange banks.
7. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
Summary
The tax treatment of international income in the Norwegian legislation is based on
taxation on a world wide basis with three different policies for the relief of double
taxation: a limited tax credit, tax exemption and tax deduction. Foreign income
derived in a country which has signed a tax treaty with Norway, is relieved from
double taxation by either tax exemption or a limited tax credit. When no treaty
applies, the taxpayer can reduce the burden of foreign taxes paid by choosing between a
limited tax credit or tax deduction. If the goal of the taxpayer is to minimize the total
tax burden, the limited tax credit is normally the choice of preference.
The asymmetric treatment of international income implies that investment in tax
treaty countries and non-treaty countries carry different effective rates of tax. In
addition and as outlined in section 3 above, the methods for relieving double taxation
do not subject foreign and domestic investments to the same tax burden. We can,
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therefore, conclude that the Norwegian tax legislation exposes the tax payer to
different effective rates of tax depending on whether she; (a) invests abroad or at
home, (b) invests in a treaty country or a non-treaty country. Thus, the rules for
taxing international capital income may affect the localization of the tax-payer's
investment and is, therefore, not neutral with respect to capital mobility.
The Problem o(Double Taxation
Although the Norwegian tax legislation serves several purposes, one of its main goals is
to avoid double taxation. This aim, however, is not executed thoroughly in connection
with dividendst-. Norwegian share holding companies can deduct dividend payments
from taxable income but must pay the municipal tax (21%) and the common tax (2%).
A shareholder which is a corporation, must pay the state tax of 27,8 percent on
received dividends, while if the share holder is an individual, he is subject to both the
state and the common tax (5%). In the latter case double taxation occurs since the
common tax is applied twice. Double taxation also occurs in connection with the state
tax when distributed dividends exceed taxable revenue. The distributing firm must in
this case pay the state tax on the part of the dividend that exceeds taxable income.
The state tax is, therefore, applied twice, first on the distributing firm's hand, and then
on the recipient 's hand.
The Chain Problem. The chain problem arises when ownership is linked in chains across
borders. For example, a Norwegian parent company owns a subsidiary in England
which in turn owns a firm in the U.S. etc. In such cases, the linkage between companies
and the fact that they are situated in different countries mayenlarge the problem of
double taxation. To alleviate accumulated double taxation, the whole consolidated
group needs to be taxed as a single company. This can be done in Norway through
direct taxation if the Ministry of Finance approves the inclusion of the whole chain of
12NOU 1989:14, p.36
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foreign companies. When applying direct taxation, the legislation does not impose
double taxation since the credit method in most cases can be used.
Tax Incentives and the Choice Between Branch Versus SubsidiaOJ
The credit method and the way it is practiced in Norway by only allowing a limited tax
credit may affect the firm's choice of undertaking investments abroad through a branch
or a foreign subsidiary. If a Norwegian company undertakes business activities abroad
through a branch, income derived by the branch will be subject to tax in Norway and
foreign losses will likewise be deductible against domestic income. When foreign
operations are carried out by a subsidiary, only distributed dividends are taxable in
Norway. Since the use of a limited tax credit to relieve double taxation of dividends
implies that the firm pays the foreign or the domestic tax rate, whichever is highest,
tax incentives are given to use foreign subsidiaries when the Norwegian effective tax
rate exceeds the foreign effective tax rate.
TaxPayer Euuitll
The Norwegian tax legislation seems first of all to reflect an objective of equity. The
rules governing the taxation of international income flows do not reflect such an
objective. If taxpayer equity is defined as if two individuals with the same income are
to pay the same tax is the main goal, the amount extracted by a foreign state must be
taken into account as part of the total tax burden imposed by Norwegian authorities.
Only then is there equality before the law. The present tax system with a limited credit
for foreign taxes paid exposes the taxpayer to different effective rates of taxation on
foreign versus domestic income and does, therefore, not provide equity. The system for
taxation of international income that grants such equity is the residence principle with
an unlimited credit for foreign taxes paid and no deferral. The use of deferral means
that the residence country gives up its tax claim on foreign income that is being
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reinvested abroad until it is repatriated as dividends. Muten (1983) has shown that the
use of deferral works like the exemption system.
In the context of equity it is meaningful to discuss taxpayer equity in the taxation of
corporations. Since corporations in most cases are owned by individuals, the corporate
tax must in the end be born by the owners of the firm. Taxpayer equity, therefore,
seems to call for a complete integration of the personal and the corporate tax13. If such
equity was achieved, the corporate tax would undertake a function as a preliminary
withholding tax against personal income or as a tool for the source country to tax
income accruing to foreign owners.
Efficiency
From an economist's perspective national tax rules in an open economy should meet
certain requirements that grant efficiency. The question of what constitutes economic
efficiency in an open economy depends on the standing point of the spectator. In
general, efficiency can be viewed from either a nationalistic or a global point of view.I+
In an open economy, savings in a country do not need to be equal to investments,
although global savings must equal global investments. The separation of investments
and savings, therefore, leads to two conflicting requirements for global efficiency.
The first requirement states that global efficiency is achieved when the marginal
product of capital is equated across countries. Otherwise production could be
reallocated and world output increased. Marginal rates of production are equated if
firms are competitive, capital is perfectly mobile and foreign and domestic investments
carry the same effective rate of tax. The latter condition implies capital export
13Sørensen (1989) p.13.
14The principles for equity and efficiency have emerged as a result of the influential work of R.
Musgrave (1969) and P. Musgrave (1969).
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neutrality since investors have no preference for one particular jurisdiction. Recall that
residence taxation with a full credit implies that income from all sources is taxed at the
same rate. If capital is fully mobile, equilibrium in international capital markets and
residence taxation require that the before - tax rate of return must be the same across
countries. Otherwise residents could borrow unlimited amounts in the low interest rate
country and invest the borrowed funds in the high interest country. In a world where
all countries apply residence taxation, interest rates would be equal, ensuring that the
marginal product of capital is equated across countries.ts Thus, capital export neutrality
exists under a system of residence taxation with a full credit and no deferral.
The second criterion for global efficiency states that the marginal rate of substitution
between present and future consumption be equal across countries. If there is a tax
wedge on savings across countries, an improvement could be obtained by reallocating
savings from countries with preferences for future consumption to countries with
preferences for present consumption. A tax system which leads to the same after tax
rates of return across countries would satisfy this condition. Under the source principle,
income is only taxed in the jurisdiction where it originates. When capital is fully
mobile, equilibrium requires that an investor is indifferent between investing in
different countries. Thus, after tax rates of return would be equated across countries. If
all countries apply the source principle, after tax rates of return would be the same and
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are equated across countries. As a
consequence, no supplier of capital would prefer one country to another and, hence,
capital import neutrality would prevail.
A more natural goal for the Norwegian tax system seems to be that of national
efficiency. Following Sørensen (1989), the level of capital exports that ensures national
15The efficiency of the residence principle in terms of assuring an optimal allocation of capital hinges
on the assumption that economic profit is equal to taxable profit in each country.
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efficiency demands that the domestic tax on capital income be set so that the social
opportunity cost of capital equals the rate of return on foreign investment after
payment of foreign taxesw. The reason for applying the post tax rate of return on foreign
investments is that foreign taxes do not add to domestic welfare.
Sørensen (1989) shows that if a country's supply of capital is completely inelastic, the
tax system that provides national efficiency is one in which foreign taxes are deducted
from foreign income taxable at home. The intuition behind this result is that when
capital supply is inelastic, taxes do only distort investment decisions, not savings.
Hence, efficiency is achieved when the pre tax return on domestic investments equals
the return from foreign investments after the payment of foreign taxes. Only then are
there no gains from repatriating foreign investments.
Concluding Remarks
From the discussion above we can conclude that national efficiency and taxpayer
equity cannot be united. However, if the goal of the tax legislation is to provide
taxpayer equity and capital export neutrality, then both objectives can be achieved by
applying the residence principle with an unlimited tax credit and no deferral.
16Theoptimal tax rule is derived under the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile, and that the
domestic economy is so small that it does not affect the foreign rate of return. The concept social
opportunity cost of capital is due to Harberger (1976) and Horst (1980), and is defined as the
weighted average of the after-tax and pre-tax rates of return to capital. The after-tax return to
capital is the cost to compensate consumers for the loss of a unit of current consumption, while the
pre-tax rate of return to capital under competitive conditions reflects the marginal product of
capital. Thus, the social opportunity cost of capital is a weighted average of the opportunity cost of
domestic savings and investments.
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The use of an unlimited credit is connected with serious incentive problems in an
internation context. A country which grants a full credit, can be exploited by other
nations since they have an incentive to increase their taxes (infinitely high) on foreign
owned capital, thereby transferring resources from the full credit country at no cost.
Since investors from the full credit country know that they will be reimbursed for any
level of taxation abroad, infinitely high rates of tax will not affect their behavior. The
incentive problem faced by granting an unlimited credit is such that unless an
international agreement can be signed preventing opportunistic behavior, the best
strategy is to allow taxes paid abroad to be deducted against the domestic tax liability
on the foreign income. By limiting the credit, the transfer of resources abroad is
prevented.
In effect, the Norwegian system for taxing international income seems to lack a clear
strategy made necessary by the new international environment, and must, to deal with
the new challenges, have a clear opinion of what is the main objective of the tax
system. If this objective is equality and capital export neutrality with respect to
international taxation of income, the requirement is that domestic and foreign
investments must be taxed by the same effective rate of tax. The only way to secure
this is by a using the residence principle combined with an unlimited credit for foreign
taxes paid even if this means reimbursing taxpayers for taxes paid abroad that exceeds
the domestic tax liability. The incentive problem arising out of the limited tax credit
can be overcome by tax treaties where the source countryagrees to tax income earned
by foreigners at the foreign rate of tax.
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Chapter3
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND
DIFFERENCES IN NATIONALTAX SYSTEMS*
Abstract
A consumer is the sole owner of a multinational firm. The firm undertakes investments
in two countries. It is shown that the imposition of taxes affects investments between
the two countries by increasing or decreasing the rental rate of capital relative to the
pre tax situation and relative to each other. The analysis demonstrates, contrary to
conventional wisdom, that taxation may in some cases change the cost of capital in
favor of the country with the highest tax rates and the least generous tax deductible
expenditures. This result is established when personal, corporate and dividend taxes
interact with tax deductible depreciation allowances. Differences in the composition of
investments when taxes are non-distortionary are also studied.
*1 am indebted to Agnar Sandmo for extremely helpful comments and suggestions.
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INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND
DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL TAX SYSTEMS
1. Introduction
The rapid integration of western economies and the effects of transnational tax rates on
investment incentives seem to have come like a bolt from the blue on most economists,
whose interest in the subject just recently have been awaken by the coming about of
the European communitys integrated market of 1993.
The effect of the corporate income tax on investment incentives has been extensively
studied by authors such as Mossin (1968), Hall and Joergensen (1967), Sandmo (1974)
and Boadway and Bruce (1979). These studies, however, have analyzed the investment
incentives of the firm in a single country setting without taking into account the aspect
of an open economy where the factors of production are free to move between countries.
Lately, Sinn (1987, 1988, 1989) and Jun (1989) among others have incorporated
taxation into an open economy setting. In contrast to traditional analysis, these
authors have put less emphasis on the distortionary effects of taxation. Nor has the
strand of literature on multinational firm behavior properly analyzed investment
incentives when tax systems differ. Horst (1971) studied optimal behavior of a
multinational firm under different tariff and tax rates, but with emphasis on transfer
pricing rather than tax competition between countries. More recent papers by Katrak
(1981) and Itagaki (1989) have focused on optimal tariffs and profit taxes between
countries without examining investment incentives of the firm.
The purpose of this paper is to study investment incentives between countries by using
neoclassical theory of investment in a partial equilibrium model. The paper explicitly
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integrates the investment decisions of the firm and the consumption decisions of the
owner in a Fisherian 2-period model of savings and investment. Within this framework,
we study the effects of personal, corporate and dividend taxes on the composition of
investments between two countries. This is done by examining whether the influence of
taxation increases or decreases the price of capital relative to the pre tax situation and
relative to that of the other country. Conventional wisdom indicates that high taxes
are discriminatory against investment in a country, and that under tax competition,
the country with the lowest absolute corporate tax rate is the most attractive to invest
in. This paper, however, shows that the interaction between different tax parameters
and tax deductible expenses may easily yield the opposite result. The general
conclusion of the paper is that the notion 'high' tax country is not meaningful in the
- sense that taxation changes investment incentives in favor of the country with the
lowest level of taxation. The effect of high taxes depends not only on their size but also
on how they interact and on the size of tax deductible expenses.
2. The Analytical Framework
The formulation of the model to be employed uses a neoclassical model for investment
incentives based on Sandmo (1974) in a Fisherian framework. The model analyses
investment incentives between two countries, called the home country and the foreign
country, based on the relative generosity of their tax systems. In line with the
convention in trade theory, capital letters denote variables pertaining to the foreign
country. We shall postpone the introduction of taxes until later and first outline the
basic features of the model.
A representative consumer living in the home country is the sole owner of a
multinational firm. The consumer has preferences defined over the amounts of
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consumption in a two period model. Her preferences can be represented by the utility
function
(1)
which is assumed to be increasing, strictly quasi concave and differentiable. The owner
has a fixed amount of income, y l in the first period, which she can use to allocate
consumption between the two periods by either borrowing or lending at given market
interest rates (R, r) which are taxed at rates (8,0)1, or by investing through the firm.
The firm can invest in capital goods (K, k) abroad and at home, and produce the
consumption good according to the production functions F(/<) and t._k). The production
functions are assumed to be locally concave in the neighborhood of an optimum. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the consumer is restricted from consumption
abroad. In a world where capital is internationally mobile, it may seem awkward that
consumption can not occur across borders. It is, however, quite reasonable to assume
that capital moves more easily across borders than people. Moreover, as will be shown
later, the consumption decision of the owner can be separated from the investment
decision of the firm and, hence, does not interfere with the investment decision of the
firm which is the scope of this paper.
The budget constraint for the first period is
Yl = Cl + (8 + s) + (QK + qk), (2)
where (8,s) denote savings and (Q, q) are the prices of capital goods. We will assume
that the prices of capital are constant over time. The capital invested in each country
lWe assume that interest income are only taxed at source. This may be due to control problems in
the residence country or simply legislative rules.
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depreciate between the first and the second period and the rates of true depreciation
are (.6., 6). At the end of the first period the firm is liquidated. In the second period,
consumption is limited by the firm's production, plus the liquidation value of the firm,
plus the amount of savings with interest added. Thus, consumption in the second
period is
~ = S[I + R(I - 8)] + S[I + r(I - O)] + [F(K) + Q(I - .6.)K] + [tk) + q(I - 6)k], (3)
Combining (2) and (3) we have that
Cl + c
2
= Yl + ~[R(I - 8) - r(I - O)] - (QK + qk) + ![F(l() + (1 - .6.)QKJ
I I I
+ ~[tk) + (1 - 6)qk], (4)
where I = 1 + r(I - O).
Equation (4) says, usmg the home country as referral, that the present value of
consumption should equal the present value of income. To find the maximum of (1)
subject to (4) we form the Lagrangian
L = U(cI, ~) - A [Cl + ~2 - Yl - ~[R(I - 8) - r(I - O)] + (QK + qk)
- ~[F(K) + (1 - .6.)QK] - ~[Ak) + (1 - 6)qkJ].
Setting the partial derivatives with respect to Cl' ~, S, kand K equal to zero, we obtain
after some rearrangement
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Ul
r(1 - O). (5)- 1 =
U2
P( K) = Q[ r(1 - O) + ~]. (6)
f'(k) = q[r(l - O) + b]. (7)
R(l - 8) = r(1 - O). (8)
Equation (5) is Fisher's famous rule for optimal allocation over time. The rule states
that the marginal rate of time preference should be equal to the interest rate after tax.
The investment decisions of the firm are given by (6) and (7). These conditions have a
rather intuitive interpretation. In an optimum, the marginal revenue should be equal to
the opportunity cost of holding a unit of capital for one period. The opportunity cost is
the income lost from forfeited savings plus the depreciation. It is worth noting from (6)
and (7) that the tax on savings is a subsidy to the firm by lowering the owner's loss
from forfeited savings. Put differently, the tax on savings reduces the discount rate
below the market rate and, therefore, promotes investment through the firm.
Equation (8) derives the condition for savings abroad. Since capital is free to move
across countries, and since under certainty financial assets are perfect substitutes for
each other, international arbitrage will equalize interest rates after tax in equilibrium.
If the equilibrium condition for some reason did not hold, the consumer would borrow
infinite amounts where the rates were lowest and lend where the rates were highest. A
more realistic deviation from the perfect market assumption is that interest rates
between the two countries are equal, but that lending and borrowing rates differ with
borrowing rates being higher than lending rates. We will not examine this case since it
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is an old result thoroughly analyzed in the literature (see for example Sandmo 1985).
The most spectacular feature of the solutions above is the result due to Fisher (1930)
stating that the firm's investment decision can be separated from the consumption
decision of its owner. The separation of consumption and investment decisions can be
thought of as a sequential process where the owner first maximizes the present value of
the firm's cash flows, and then, given the goods made available through the firm,
decides on her savings.
9. The Introduction ofTaxes and Depreciation Allowances
The separation of consumption and investment decisions means that we can study the
impact of taxes on investment decisions solely by analyzing the maximization of the
present value of the firm's production. From the above, it should be clear that since the
value of the firm should be maximized to its owner, the appropriate discount rate to
use is the consumption rate of interest r, net of the personal tax rate O in the home
country.
It is a well known result in public finance that a corporate tax is non-distortionary if
taxable profit is the same as true economic profit. The insight is that in real terms,
maximizing the full profit is equivalent to maximizing part of it. This result, however,
hinges upon the assumption that the firm can deduct its true costs from taxable
income. The introduction of taxes very often implies a set of rules governing
depreciation rates. In general, these rates deviate from the true rates of depreciation,
thereby causing a distorting effect of the corporate tax. In the following we shall
measure the impact of this distortion between countries.
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Since we are operating in a two period model there is no difference between the true
capital stock and the accounting capital stock. The tax legislation in both countries
provide for deductibility of interest on the full value of the capital stock. The firm's
cost deductions can therefore be based on the opportunity cost of capital as given by
equations (6) and (7).
Denoting tax deductible depreciation allowances (A,a), taxable profit abroad and at
home is
II= F(K) - (r » A)QK,
1r = Ak) - (r+ a)qk,
where capital gains from the liquidation of the firm are not taxed. In principle, such
gains should be taxed according to the difference between the booked value of the firm
and the sale value. To simplify the analysis, and since this effect is qualitatively similar
to the depreciation effect, it is omitted.
There are two basic principles for taxation of international capital income: the source
principle and the residence principle. Under the source principle income is taxed only in
the country where it is produced. The consequence of the source principle is that the
firm faces different tax rates in each country.
The residence principle implies that all income is subject to tax in the country of
residence of the firm regardless of 'geographic' source. Most countries levy taxes
according to the residence principle on their residents, while applying the source
principle on foreigners. The application of the residence principle does not distort
investment incentives if it is followed by a full credit for foreign taxes imposed on
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foreign source income against taxes in the country of residence. If a full credit is given,
the firm faces the same effective tax on all investments. In practice, the foreign tax
credit is limited in size to the domestic tax liability falling on the foreign source
income. As a consequence, the firm pays the highest of the foreign and the domestic tax
rate, and the effective tax rate differs between investments in different countries. This
pratice is in reality a reinstatement of the source principle, and makes it fruitful to
capture the essence of international taxation of income by examining the impact of
source based taxation.
We will initially assume that distributed dividends from the investments of the firm
are not subject to tax in any country, and will in a later section analyse the effect of
dividend taxation.
Maximizing the owner's utility through the firm by the separation property, the firm
maximizes its cash flows minus the tax liabilities. Defining corporate tax rates as (T,t),
the present value of the cash flow is
v= - (Qf( + qk) + l[F(I<) + (1 - ~)Qf(] - T[F(K) - (r+ A)Qf(]
I I
+ ~[jk) + (1 - 6)qk] - f[Jk) - (r + a)qk].
The first order conditions of the firm are
(9)
(10)
Equations (9) and (10) determine the optimal investment decisions of the firm. As can
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be seen from the equations, taxes do affect the marginal cost of the firm, and may
increase and decrease the cost of capital depending on the interaction between the
personal tax on savings, the corporate tax and the tax deductible depreciation
allowances.
Suppose now that lump sum taxes apply to persons, that is, () = O, and true
depreciation rates equal tax deductible depreciation allowances. Equations (9) and (10)
reduce to
F'(K) = Q(r + ~). (11)
f'(k) = q( r + 8). (12)
In the absence of distortionary taxes, and if marginal revenue is equal in both
countries, the firm would invest in the country where the production costs were lowest.
The owner of the firm, however, maximizes the post-tax return on investments. As a
result, the firm may not invest where the costs of production are lowest. Instead,
commercial decisions may be guided to the country with the most generous tax system.
There are two ways in which taxes may lead to a distortion of pretax prices in this
model. First, they may reduce the return from savings or the cost of borrowing and,
thus, lead to increased investments through the firm. Second, taxes may influence the
rental rates of capital in each country and distort investment incentives in favor of the
country which experiences a reduction in its price of capital relative to that of the other
country. In the next section we will investigate how taxes affect the rental rates of
capital.
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4. Investment Incentives Between Countries
To study the effect of taxes on the composition of investments between the home and
the foreign country, we must examine whether taxation increases or decreases the
shadow price of capital relative to the pre tax situation. By doing so we can, given
some assumptions regarding the size of certain tax parameters between the two
countries, tell whether taxation makes it cheaper to invest in one country relative to
the other. More specifically, we compare the rental rates of capital between the two
countries before and after the imposition of taxes. Define the rental rate of capital in
the foreign and the home country before the corporate tax as
p= Q(r+ ~). (13)
p = q(r + b). (14)
The rental rates of capital after the introduction of taxes are,
(15)
(16)
Let pti P and Pti P be the relative rental rates of capital in each country. If the
fractions are equal to one, taxation does not alter the price of capital. A fraction less
than one implies that taxation lowers the price of capital and vice versa for a fraction
above one. We shall say that the tax system in the home country favors, is neutral to,
or discriminates against investment at home if the relative rate of increase in the rental
rate is less than, equal to, or bigger than that of the foreign country, that is,
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(17)
Substituting from (13), (14), (15) and (16) into (17) and rearranging the terms we get,
(18)
This is the general condition for the discriminatory effect between capital goods in the
home and the foreign country of the personal and the corporate tax. We see that a high
corporate tax may be advantageous to a country if the subsidy effect caused by the
personal tax rate exceeds the depreciation effect. In this case, the country with the
highest corporate tax (less than one) has the lowest price on capital. This case is likely
to occur when the tax deductible depreciation allowance is very close to the true
depreciation rate. For the tax systems to be neutral with respect to the composition of
investments between the two countries, corporate taxes and tax depreciation must be
equal to true depreciation across countries. In the following we will assume that the
corporate tax is less than one. This is a realistic assumption since nominal tax rates in
reallife do not exceed 100 percent.
There are four special cases of (18) which are of particular interest. First, when true
depreciation is equal in both countries (8 = ~), (18) simplifies to
(1 - ttt[t(8 - a) - rO] ~ (1 - Ttt[ T(8 - A) - rO]. (19)
Inspection of (19) indicates that the influence of the corporate tax on the relative price
of capital between the two countries depends on the sign of the big bracket on both
sides. More specifically, differentiation of the left hand side of (19) with respect to the
corporate tax t, shows that an increase in the corporate tax will reduce the relative
price of capital in the home country if (8 - a - rO) is negative. It then follows that the
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impact of differences in the size of the corporate tax depends on the relative size of the
depreciation allowance.
If the firm is being subsidized in both countries, that is, (o - a - rO) is negative
(similarly for the foreign country), then investment incentives change in favor of the
country with the highest corporate tax and the highest depreciation allowance. The
opposite conclusion holds in a positive regime, where investment incentives change in
favor of the country with the lowest corporate tax and the highest depreciation
allowance. The general conclusion is that high depreciation allowances are always
advantageous, and that the impact of the corporate tax depends on whether the
depreciation allowance is so large that it together with the personal tax on savings
becomes a subsidy on capital.
The second case of interest occurs when true depreciation equals depreciation
allowances in each country (o = a, fl. = A). Equation (18) is simplified to
- rO(~ <5 - rOlr__.t_§) (~ <5 (~(r-=-n 5 ~,or (r-::-TJ 5 (r-=-n. (19)
The conclusion is, then, that when true depreciation equals depreciation allowances,
the rental rate of capital is changed in favor of the country which has the lowest
corporate tax rate and the most durable capital. The result is clearly in line with
intuition which suggests that high corporate taxes reduces the return from investment
through the firm and, therefore, increases the opportunity cost of capital.
Suppose now that corporate taxes are equal across countries. Equation (18) can then be
rewritten as
tr[(o - a) - (fl. - A)] + t(OA - fl.a) + rO(o - fl.) ~ o. (20)
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Equal corporate taxes changes the relative price of capital in favor of the country with
the most durable capital, the highest depreciation allowances and the lowest
depreciation ratio as given by 0/0: and !:l./A. It is interesting to note that the absolute
difference between true and tax deductible depreciation rates, that is (o - 0:) and (!:l. -
A), as well the relative size between the depreciation ratios matter. As can be seen from
(20), if the first bracket is zero, reflecting that the absolute difference between
depreciation allowances and true depreciation is equal, the left hand side of the
equation is different from zero if 0/0: f !:l./ A, indicating that the country with the lowest
ratio is at an advantage.
The-fourth case of interest is when corporate taxes and true rates of depreciation are
equal in both countries. (18) simplifies to
(21)
This means that the country with the highest depreciation allowance experiences a
relative reduction in its rental rate of capital. The intuition is that when all tax
parameters except for the depreciation allowances are equal across countries and true
depreciation rates are the same, then the only distortion that matters is the size of the
depreciation allowance. As intuition suggests, it is the country which has the most
generous allowance that is favored.
5. Investment Incentives and Dividend Taxation
The foregoing analysis does not take into account that countries tax dividends. The
residence country in addition often taxes dividends derived abroad. In such cases a
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credit is given for taxes paid to the foreign country which in pratice is limited to the
domestic tax liability on the foreign dividend. The limited credit implies that the firm
pays the highest of the foreign or the domestic tax rate.
To capture that dividends in real life are taxed at different rates in different countries,
we will assume that dividends are taxed according to the source principle. Define D as
the tax on foreign dividends and d as the tax on domestic dividends.
The present value of the the cash flow of the firm is now
v = - (Q[( + qk) + (1 - D) [~[F(I<) + (1 - ~)Q[(] - ~[F(I<) - (r+ A)Q[(]]
+ (1 - d)[~[Jk) + (1 - 6)qk] - ~[Jk) - (r+ et)qk]].
The first order conditions of the firm are
(22)
( ) [ - td - O ] [1: ~)]f' k = qr 1+ (1 _ t)(l _ d) + q u + ~ . (23)
Substituting from (22) and (23) into (17), and examining the change in the relative
rental rates of capital, we see that dividend taxation will change prices in favor of
investment in the home country, lead to no change, or change prices in favor of the
foreign country according to whether
(~[t({J - et) + q td - O)] ~ (!____±____Q_}_[TI(~ _ A) + q TD - O)].
(r-:=-t) 1 - d) > (~ 1 - D) (24)
As expected, the result depends on the relative size between different tax parameters.
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To be able to derive some meaningful conclusions from this we will examine three
special cases in which (24) is simplified and which seem to be of practical interest.
First, if corporate taxes, true depreciation and depreciation allowances are equal in
both countries and there is no tax distortion on depreciation (T = t, 0= .6. = A = a), (24)
can be rewri t ten as
(ltd_- ar) <>= f tD - B)
( 1 -D)' (25)
Equation (25) shows the effect on the rental rate of capital of differences in the level of
dividend taxation between countries when all other tax parameters are equal. The
rather surprising result is, then, that we cannot infer this effect without knowing the
size of the corporate tax relative to the personal tax on savings. Suppose for example,
that T = t < B. The numerator on both sides becomes negative irrespective of the size
of the dividend tax and, hence, the whole fraction is negative. An increase in the
dividend tax will actually increase the size of the negative fraction and reduce the price
of capital. In this situation the price of capital changes in favor of the country with the
'highest dividend tax. Obviously, the conclusion does not hold if T = t > B and the
fractions are positive. In this case the country with the lowest dividend tax is favored.
The second case of interest occurs when corporate and dividend taxes differ between
countries and depreciation allowances are equal across countries and equals true
depreciation. Equation (24) reduces to
(td - B) <5 ( TD - B)
(1 - d) (1 - t):> (1 - D)(1 - 1'). (26)
This is the same expression as in (25) except for the impact of differences in the
corporate tax. In the presence of taxation, the rental rate of capital is changed in favor
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of the country with the lowest corporate tax and the lowest dividend tax. Equation
(26) indicates that if a country does not have an absolute advantage in low taxes, there
exists a perfect trade off between the corporate tax and the dividend tax. If the
corporate tax in one country is higher than in the other, the difference can be offset by
lowering the dividend tax below that of the other country until the difference in the
level of dividend taxation exactly offsets the difference in the corporate taxation.
Suppose now that only the true rate of depreciation is equal across countries. Equation
(24) can then be rewritten as
(27)
Equation (27) shows that when depreciation allowances are introduced, the perfect
substitutability between the corporate and the dividend tax vanishes. If depreciation
allowances exceed the true rate of depreciation, it is advantageous for a country to have
a high corporate tax thereby enlarging the subsidy effect from depreciation allowances
as shown in the first term, and countering the effect of high corporate taxes in the
second term by lowering the dividend tax. The opposite result holds when true
depreciation exceeds depreciation allowances. The overall conclusion from (26) is that
there is a trade off between the depreciation effect and the effect from the interaction
between the personal tax and the corporate and dividend tax. If for example, one
country has the lowest corporate tax, the lowest dividend tax and the highest
depreciation allowance, conventional wisdom would indicate that investment incentives
should change in its favor. This is not necessarily so. The reader can convince himself
of this by letting t = 0.40 < T = 0.9, A = 0.45 < a = 0.5, d = 0.3 < D = 0.35, where r = ()
= 0.1 and ~ = 6 = 0.3. In this case the foreign country is at an absolute disadvantage on
all accounts according to conventional wisdom. The result is, however, that the cost of
capital changes in favor of the foreign country. The reason is that the high corporate
-66-
tax increases the subsidy from depreciation to the extent that the foreign country's
absolute disadvantage as a "high tax" country is reversed and an international tax
paradox arises.t Surprisingly, the international tax paradox is quite robust to changes
in the foreign corporate tax rate. For example, if we lower the foreign rate to 55
percent the cost of capital still changes in favor of the foreign country. This result is
interesting since it suggests that one should be very careful interpreting the effects of
taxation on investment incentives.
6. Borrowing Constraints and Taxation
The above analysis may give the impression that taxes only distort investment
incentives when true profits deviate from taxable profits. In principle, this conclusion is
correct, but taxes do matter for investment incentives even when no tax induced
distortions exist. When borrowing constraints exists, the after tax return from the firm
will determine where the owner wants to invest and, hence, taxes matter.
To model borrowing constraints, we will assume that there is a restriction on the total
amount of money that can be invested through the firm. This restriction can be
perceived as resulting from transaction costs in connection with borrowing costs or
installation costs due to the physical installation of equipment. In both cases we will
assume that these costs increase more than proportionally with each unit of capital
invested through the firm. Thus, the transaction costs will at a certain levelovertake
the gains from investments and, therefore, become prohibitive. We will assume that
this level of investment, called 'Ø, is below the amount of money that would have been
invested if no transaction costs applied. The borrowing constraint can be written as,
2Various types of international tax paradoxes also arise in Sinn (1988, 1989).
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K + k = '¢. (28)
To see that corporate taxes do have an impact on investment incentives when no tax
distortions exist, we will assume that no dividend taxes applies, that there is no tax on
savings and that true and tax deductible depreciation are equal. In this case the
corporate tax is non-distortionary and the maximization problem of the firm can be
rewritten as
Max V= - (QK + qk) - M[F(K) + (1 - ~)QK] + ti ~ ;~[Jk) + (1 - 6)qk],
s.t. K + k= '¢.
By solving the Lagrangian to this problem and setting the first order condition for
investment in the foreign country equal to that of the home country we get
- Q + ti ~ B[F'(K) + Q(1 - ~)] = - q + H ~ ;~[f'(k) + q(1 - 6)]. (29)
Suppose now that taxes in both countries are zero initially. Comparative statics on (29)
with respect to Kand T gives
dK _ F' (ID + Q( 1 - 6)
aT - ftt( k) + (1 - T)F"(K) < O. (30)
Equation (30) shows that corporate taxes are not neutral with respect to investment
decisions even when they are non-distortionary. The country which increases its
corporate tax above that of the other country will reduce the amount of money
invested in it. The reason, of course, is that the owner of the firm prefers to receive the
whole profit instead of for example, half of it.
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7. Concluding Remarks
We have explored the effects of differences in national tax systems on investment
incentives in a partial equilibrium model. The analysis shows that the relative sizes of
interacting tax parameters determine whether taxes increase or lower the price of
capital in a country relative to that of the other country. Hence, the notion 'high' tax
country is not meaningful. As a matter of fact, the imposition of taxes may change
investment incentives in favor of the country with the highest tax rates.
A natural extension of the model is to construct a general equilibrium model. Such a
model would be able to capture whether a rise in one or more of the taxes in one
country would, through international equilibrium conditions, lead to incidence effects
that would increase the price of capital in other countries. The need for a general
equilibrium model, however, does not render the partial equilibrium approach useless.
If that were to happen, the results from the general equilibrium model would have to
lead to counteracting tendencies that would reverse the initial effects of differences in
tax systems. Such drastic conclusions would have to violate very sensible stability
conditions which reduces the plausibility of such models.
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Chapter4
OPTIMAL TAXATION, CAPITAL MOBILITY
ANDTAXEVASION*
Abstract
Starting from the issue of capital flight and tax evasion, this paper considers the
optimal taxation of savings when a consumer can save both abroad and domestically.
Due to bank secrecy laws and tax havens, the government 's ability to tax foreign
savings is a function of money allocated to tax enforcement. Thus, the allocation of
savings between countries is a decision under uncertainty. Given consumer behavior,
the problem of the government is to decide on how taxes should be set optimally on
foreign and domestic savings and how much money if any should be allocated to tax
enforcement.
*1 would like to thank Agnar Sandmo, Vesa Kanniainen, Jan I. Haaland, Peter Birch SOrensen and
Oystein Aadnevik for helpful comments and suggestions.
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OPTIMALTAXATION, CAPITAL MOBILITY
ANDTAXEVASION
1. Introduction
The rapid process of linking together national economies by allowing free factor
mobility has stirred a growing public concern over problems of capital flight and tax
evasion on capital. Many countries fear that capital mobility may lead to capital flight
from high to low tax countries in such large amounts that it deprives a nation its tax
base and as a consequence, its welfare system. Today's international climate with bank
secrecy laws protecting foreign investor's anonymity in addition to substantial
differences in national tax rates, makes this fear a real one.
The problem of international capital flows evading domestic wealth and capital income
taxes is also worrisome both from an equity as well as an efficiency point of view. To
the extent that labor cannot evade taxation as easily as capital, labor is subject to
higher effective tax rates than capital. The presente of capital flight will, therefore,
impose a higher tax burden on individuals who only posses human capital, and thereby
create inequality.
The efficiency effect of tax evasion is more ambiguous. Giovannini (1989a) is concerned
that the combination of capital controls and secrecy laws will represent insuperable
obstacles to the development of an efficient European Capital market by limiting the
possibility of openess. Giovannini (1989b) and Razin and Sadka (1989) have studied the
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welfare effects of capital flight. The standard assumption in these authors' works is
that foreign savings cannot be taxed. Facing the problem of complete tax evasion on
foreign income, it is welfare improving to set a binding export quota on capital. In the
paper by Razin and Sadka (1989), the export quota should be set so high that the
marginal product of capital in the home country falls below that of the world, thus
resulting in over-investment in the home country. This is a second best result in which
increasing the number of distortions in the economy makes the nation better off.
It is by the nature of the problem very difficult to assess how widespread capital flight
is and how sensitive capital is to differences in transnational tax rates. Dooley (1988)
estimates for a large group of developing countries that capital flight from these
countries makes up about one third of their external debt in the period 1977 - 1984.
Most of the evidence of capital flight, however, is in indirect form such as rerouting of
capital flows through tax havens after the imposition of taxes. One such example is
given by Papke (1988) who assesses the impact of the u.s. withholding tax of 30
percent levied on interest payments to nonresidents. Before the withholding tax was
repealed in 1984, virtually all U.S. corporate bond issues were done through the
Netherlands Antilles. Moreover, in 1983, almost one third of all interest payments of
U.S. citizens to foreigners were channeled through the Netherlands Antilles which
through a tax treaty with the U.S. offered a zero rate withholding tax on interest
payments as well as anonymity vis a vis the recipient's home country.
Although evidence suggests that governments have difficulties taxing foreign source
income, governments derive positive tax revenue from foreign source income. The
problem of capital flight and tax evasion, therefore, seems to be a problem of tax
enforcement. It is this problem that will be the focus of this paper. More specifically,
the purpose of this paper is twofold.
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First, our objective is to construct a model of capital tax evasion 10 a partial
equilibrium setting. We will analyze the intertemporal savings decisions of an
individual who can allocate consumption between two periods by borrowing and
lending abroad and at home, and where the return from foreign savings with a certain
probability can evade domestic taxation. Within this framework the model 's
comparative static properties are examined. Very little if any work has been done along
these lines in the field of capital tax evasion despite that the literature on income tax
evasion was pioneered in the seventies by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
Second, the purpose of the paper is to examine the problem of capital mobility and tax
evasion within the literature on optimal taxation.' We will assume that the government
by allocating funds to tax enforcement can influence the probability of being detected
as a tax evader. Hence, the purpose of the analysis is to examine how taxes and the
probability of detection should be set optimally, provided that the consumer saves both-
abroad and at home.
2. A Model
To incorporate tax evasion on capital into the analysis of optimal taxation we will use
a two period model of a small open economy where capital is mobile internationally.r To
simplify, we will assume that there is only one consumer in the economy. This
assumption is equivalent to assume that all consumers are identical. The consumer
lKaplov (1990) has studied optimal commodity taxation and enforcement costs in a closed economy.
Sandmo (1976) offers a survey of the optimal taxation literature while Cowell (1985) has summarized
the findings in the literature on tax evasion.
2The structure of the model is partly based on Sandmo (1981) who analyses tax evasion in the
context of labor supply and personal income.
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derives utility, from consumption in the two periods and we will assume that the utility
function is additive separable in consumption, thus,
(1)
where b(g) is second period utility from consumption of the public good.f To simplify
the model, we will assume that the government is only active in the second period.
The individual can allocate consumption between the two periods by distributing an
initial income Yl' to savings abroad S, and savings at home s. The budget constraint for
the first period is
Cl = Yl - S - S. (2)
We will assume that income from foreign savings is not taxed in the source country.
This is obviously a simplification but can be justified if we think of foreign savings as
occurring in tax havens where tax rates are zero or close to zero, or if the tax
authorithies in the foreign country due to control problems cannot tax foreigners.
The allocation of savings between the home and the foreign country is a decision under
uncertainty. The reason being that foreign savings is only known to the tax authorities
with a probability q, depending on the amount of money allocated to tax enforcement.
Thus the rate of return from foreign savings is subject to tax with a probability q. Note
that the consumer makes his subjective assessment of the probability of taxation
occurring. In contrast, domestic savings is known to the tax authorities with certainty,
and is taxed at the rate t. The consumer's problem is to decide how to allocate his
3The separability between private and public consumption as given by (1) makes sure that
government spending on public goods does not affect the consumer's consumption. We will assume
that both u(C2) and b(g) are concave.
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initial income between the two different forms of savings facing the uncertainty
regarding foreign savings. By placing savings abroad the consumer becomes a tax
evader since we do not make explicit allowance for the possibility that the individual
might want to report foreign income. In a sense the consumer can do so simply by
placing all savings in the domestic market. It is, therefore, no need for such an
accommodation.
If the consumer is caught as a tax evader, he must immediately pay a tax rate P on his
foreign earnings. The tax P, can be thought of as consisting of the regular tax on
foreign income as well as a penalty for tax evasion. The consumer makes his decision
about how much to save in the beginning of the first period. Second period
consumption depends on his tax treatment. If caught as a tax evader, his consumption
becomes c~, while in the event that he escapes detection, his consumption is ~. The
budget constraints for the two outcomes are
c~= 8(1 + r(1 - t)) + S(l + R) + y, (3)
4 = 8(1 + r(1 - t)) + S(l + R(l - P)) + Y + y, (4)
where y and yare lump sum income in the second period. The main reason for allowing
lump sum income to differ in the two states is for analytical convenience, but the
difference in lump sum income also has an economic interpretation since y can be
thought of as minus any fine due to tax evasion.
A problem arises in the model if interest expenses can be deducted against taxable
income. In that case the consumer would like to report foreign borrowing, but reporting
foreign savings contradicts the model. Since the purpose of this paper is to study the
effects of capital flight and tax evasion, it seems reasonable to eliminate this problem
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by restricting the model in the sense that only foreign savings are allowed. Hence, the
consumer is a lender in the foreign market (S > O). Although this assumption reduces
the generality of the model, it has no implications for the cases we attempt to study.
Substituting (2), (3) and (4) into (1), the consumer will now choose sand S so as to
maximize
U-= V(YI - S - S) + (1 - q)u(s(l + r{1 - t)) + S(l + R) + y) +
qu(s(l + r{1 - t)) + S(l + R(l - P)) + Y + y) + b(g). (5)
The first order conditions for an interior maximum of (5) with respect to sand S are
given by
U -= - v'(c1) + (1 - q)u'(c~)(l + r{1- t)) + qU'(q)(l + r{1- t)) = O.s (6)
Us -= - v'(c1) + (1 - q)u'(c~)(l + R) + qu'(c~)(l + R(l- P)) = O. (7)
Rearranging (6), the optimum condition for domestic savings becomes
v' ( ct) 1 + r{1 - t), (8)
(1 - q)u'( c~) + qu'( q)
which is Fisher's rule for optimization over time stating that the marginal rate of
substitution should be equal to the price of future in terms of present consumption,
which is the discount factor. Unfortunately, the optimum condition for foreign savings
cannot be interpreted as easily. The first order conditions for savings describe an
interior maximum. The focal point of this paper will be to examine the case of an
~_I/'; ..~~~~_=':\\ ..'~~.)'-{~)~(,J)lt.
F~:·~~_l0"'Z:~ .:.\
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interior solution, where the optimal choice of tax parameters induce the consumer to
save both abroad and domestically. Thus, it is of interest to study whether taxes, the
probability of detection and interest rates can be such that an interior solution is an
optimum. If we for the moment assume that fl = Oand S = O,then
~ = 8(1 + r(1 - t)) + y, and ~ = 8(1 + r(1 - t)) + y, thus, c~= c~= C2.
From (6) and (7) it now follows that the condition for S = O becomes
q > R - r(1RP
t) , or R(1 - qP) < r(1 - t). (9)
The first expression in equation (9) states that for foreign savings to be zero, the
probability of detection must be greater than the risk premium for foreign savings. We
see that if R - r(1 - t) = O, then (9) requires that q > O, that is, when there are no
gains to foreign savings, the deterrence condition is that the probability of detection is
positive. The second expression of (9) is just another way of writing the deterrence
condition, saying that the expected return to savings abroad must be less than the
return to domestic savings if foreign savings are to be zero. Hence, to incur a risk
averse person to take this gamble, he must be compensated. Equation (9), therefore,
restricts the range of the parameters necessary to achieve an interior solution. If R <
r(1 - t), there are no gains from foreign savings and S = o. If R(1 - P) > r(1 - t), there
is no penalty for tax evasion and 8 = o. Thus, R(1 - P) < r(1 - t) < R, for an interior
solution to be the optimum one. Note, however, that the range of the parameters have
been determined under the assumption that fl = o. If fl :f. O, the picture becomes more
complicated since the tightness of the conditions depends on income effects.
The second order conditions for an interior maximum are
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u < Oss and IHI = > o.
The maximization of the consumer's utility function yields the saving demand
functions
s = sep, t, q, y, y), (10)
S = sep, t, q, y, y). (11)
The utility obtained from these demand functions gives the indirect utility function
V = V(P, t, q, y, y, g). (12)
It can easily be shown using the envelope theorem where At, A2 and A3 are the Lagrange
multipliers of equations (2), (3) and (4), respectively, that the partial derivatives of the
indirect utility function with respect to the tax parameters are+
(13)
Vp = - A3SR, (14)
4Thi8 can be seen by examining the Lagrange function
A = v(ct) + (1 - q)u(c~) + qu(c~) + b(g) - Al(ct - Yl + 8 + S)
\ o A- I\2(c2 - 8(1 + r(1 - t» - S(1 + R) - y)
- A3(c~ - 8(1 + r(1 - t» - S(1 + R(1 - P» - y - y)
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Vq = u(c~) - u(~), (15)
(16)
(17)
The Lagrange multiplier A3 denotes the marginal expected utility of income in the case
the consumer is caught as a tax evader, while (A2 + A3) is the expected marginal utility
from certain income in the second period.
9. Comparative Static Results
The aim of this section is to examine the comparative static results of the model by
investigating the properties of the Slutsky equations. It is well known in theory that
the total effect of say a change in the tax of domestic savings can be decomposed into
an income effect and a substitution effect, where the latter gives the change in savings
demand provided that the consumer is compensated so as to maintain the same level of
utility as before the tax change. In our case we have the choice of stating the
-
compensating income necessary to maintain a certain level of utility U, by three income
parameters, Yl, y, or y. It turns out that the use of Yl does not lend itself very easily to
interpretation, so for all purposes our choice of compensating income is limited to y or
y. In optimum, then, using y as compensating income
S( t, P, q, if) == S(t, P, q, y( t,P, q,if)), (I8a)
- -
s( t, P, q, U) == s( t, P, q, y( t,P,q, U)), (I9a)
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where sand S denote the compensated savings demand corresponding to lump sum
income y. We could alternatively have expressed this identity in terms of yas
S( t, P, q, il) :: S( t, P, q, y( t,P, q, il)), (18b)
- -
s(t, P, q, Cf):: s(t, P, q, y(t,P,q,Cf)). (1gb)
In deriving the Slutsky equations we will study changes in t compensated by changes in
y, while changes in q and P are compensated by y. The reason for this division is that it
considerably improves the interpretation and intuition behind the results.
From (18b) we now obtain
as/ ap = sp - (as/ ay)( ay/ ap), (20)
where s, denotes the substitution effect using y as compensating income.
The term (ay/ ap) is the derivative of the expenditure function using y as expenditure
minimizing income. We can find the derivative of the expenditure function directly by
using the implicit function theorem. Since we are examining the revenue adjustment
following a tax change necessary to keep the consumer on the same utility surface as
previously, the derivative of the expenditure function is given by the marginal rates of
substitution of the indirect utility function, thus
(ay/ ap) = - Vp/ Vy = RS. (21)
Substituting (21) into (20), we obtain the Slutsky equation as
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oS/oP = s, - RS(OS/oy). (22)
By the same procedure we derive the remaining Slutsky equations as
oS/ot = St - sr( oS/ oy). (23)
(24)
os/ot = St - sr( os/ oy). (25)
os/oP = Sp - SR( os/ oy). (26)
os/oq = Sq - [u( c~) - u( c~)] (os/ oy) / A3. (27)
From the concavity of the expenditure function it follows that the compensating own
price effects are nonpositive, thus
(28)
As regards the compensated cross price effects, these signs cannot be determined from
theory. It seems, however, reasonable to assume that when the return from foreign
savings decrease, domestic savings increase and vice versa. Hence,
Sp > O, and St > o. (29)
The income effects are given by the last terms in the Slutsky equations. In general
there are no restrictions on the sign of these terms, but we will assume that domestic
savings decreases with lump sum income (y), while foreign savings increases since fl is
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equal to minus any fine. Hence, an increase in lump sum income in the second period
implies a reduction in the fine, thus5
as/ ay < o, and as/ay> o. (30)
Applying the same argument again, it follows that
as/ ay> o, and as/ay> o. (31)
Turning to the total effects, it now follows from (28) and (31) that an increase in the
tax on domestic savings implies reduced domestic savings for a lender, while for a
borrower the outcome depends on the relative magnitudes of the income and
substitution effects. This result is in accordance with standard theory of savings and
taxation. We see from (26), that an increase in the tax on foreign savings increases
domestic savings since we have assumed S > o.
Intuition suggests that the total price effects on domestic savings would be duplicated
on foreign savings in the sense that one would expect an increase in P to decrease
foreign savings when the consuI_!leris a lender. As can be seen from (22), using (28) and
(30), this is indeed the case. Moreover, from (23) we see that an increase in the
domestic tax increases foreign savings if the individual is a borrower in the domestic
market, otherwise the effect is indeterminate.
The effect of a change in savings due to an increase in the probability of being detected
as a tax evader cannot be determined without further assumptions. There is, however,
another method of deriving the Slutsky equations which provides more information and
5Using the first order conditions to derive the Slutsky equations, it can be seen that the income
effects are sensible to the relative size of the domestic and foreign interest rates. If we for example,
assume that R ~ r, then the signs in (30) are reversed(See Appendix B).
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is helpful in this case. By differentiating the first order conditions (6) and (7), the
emerging Slutsky equations (see appendix A) show that if R ~ r, domestic savings
increase when the probability of detection increases, while foreign savings decrease.
The necessary restriction on interest rates to bring forward these results, may be seen
as generated from two different processes. First, the determination of the relative size
of the two interest rates could be thought of as emerging from trade between
non-profit organizations dominating the market. Under such circumstances interest
rates would be equalized (R = r). Second, the result could have been generated from
international arbitrage brought forward by domestic investors who could completely
evade taxation on the return from foreign savings. In this case the arbitrage condition
becomes r(1 - t) = R, which implies that R ~ r. None of these two cases, however,
seems very realistic.
-l. Optimum Capital Taxes in the Presence ofTax Evasion
The modeling of tax evasion seems to pose some fundamental problems inherent in the
asymmetry of information that such models contain. The first problem relates to the
asymmetry of information between the government and the tax-payer concerning the
probability of detection as a tax evader. Unlike Ulysses, who before setting out towards
the Sirens, knew the ex post outcome of not binding himself, the individual faces
uncertainty regarding the outcome of his savings decisions. As Isachsen and Strøm
(1981) have shown in their study of the black economy in Norway, most individuals
overestimate the probability of detection. The question, therefore, arises as to whether
the government should maximize ex ante or ex post utility. The easiest way to solve
this problem is by assuming that the consumer by coincidence has the same probability
belief of detection as the true probability of detection. Ex post and ex ante utility will
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then be the same. For simplicity we will adopt this approach here, but one might as
well have maximized a weighted average of ex ante and ex post utility.
The second difficulty that arises concerns the general formulation of the model. Since
we have assumed that the economy is made up of one consumer or many identical
consumers, the government by detecting one tax evader, must be lead to believe that
all individuals are tax evaders. To avoid this problem we assume that only those
caught are penalized. Thus, any person suspected of a crime must De convicted on
behalf of the proofs presented against him. This assumption seems to be in line with
how most courts of law treat criminals. Note that we could have constructed a model
containing two groups of individuals, one non-evader group who only saved
domestically, and one group of evaders who saved both abroad and domestically.
Preferences would then differ among the two groups. This way of formulating the
model, however, does not alleviated the problem since detection of one tax evader
would lead the government to believe that the whole group of evaders was guilty of tax
evasion.
Another problem is whether one should allow illegal behavior to be represented in the
social welfare function. Put differently, should utility from foreign savings be accepted.
A concern for 'fairness' or obedience towards the legislation would lead policy-makers
to punish illegal behavior by constructing a welfare function consisting of utility from
consumption plus individual welfare weights reflecting the society's attitude towards
tax evasion. In a two group setting as outlined above, moralistic preferences could
easily be incorporated by attaching different welfare weights to each group reflecting
the society's tolerance towards tax evasion. A general discussion on how the welfare
weights should be constructed could, for example in this case, be based on the concept
of the value of resources to an individual as depicted by Sen (1982). The two group
model has its advantage over the single consumer model by incorporating the aspect of
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equity. Obviously, this is a weakness of the single consumer model which focus is solely
on the efficiency of taxation facing the problem of tax evasion.
Realizing that the equity aspect of taxation cannot be represented in the single
consumer model, the use of welfare weights only reflects moralistic considerations. The
government can undertake two extreme standpoints towards tax evasion. The first is to
ban tax evasion altogether. It can do so simply be setting the fine 11 indefinitely high
[Becker (1968)]. In real life such a threat may not be credible since it on grounds of
justice may be perceived as overstating the seriousness of the crime. Thus, moralistic
considerations must be weighted against the credibility problem. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to elaborate on this issue, but interested readers are referred to Becker
(1968) as a first reference. The second view is to fully allow preferences for illegal
activities to be tolerated in the social welfare function. We will adopt this view here.
Whether we use some functional form to discriminate against foreign savings or not,
will not add anything of significance to the analysis. Therefore, to leave the
mathematics as uncluttered as possible we take the extreme view. The problem, then,
is one of deciding which instruments of taxation causes the smallest possible loss in
welfare and balances the public budget.
Since the consumer side of the economy can be treated as if there was only one
consumer and we have adopted a utilitarian approach, the welfare function of the
consumer is
W = V(t, P, q, y, y, g). (32)
We assume that the government is only active in the second period and derives revenue
from taxes on foreign and domestic savings. The revenue T, is spent on public
consumption g, from which the consumer derives utility, and tax enforcement. The
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probability of detection for not reporting foreign savings is a continuous and
differentiable function of the amount of money e allocated to tax enforcement. The
probability function is written as q( e) with q'( e) > O. It seems reasonable to assume
that the marginal return to of tax enforcement is decreasing so that q"(e) < O,and q(O)
= O.Public revenue is now given by
T( t,P,q,y;y) = sri + ti.. e)SRP - y - ti.. e)Y· (33)
The government must balance its revenue against its spending and the money allocated
to tax enforcement, thus
T( t,P,q,y,y) = 9 + e. (34)
The problem facing the government is to find the level of public expenditure that
maximizes the welfare of the consumer. A central question in this model is whether
revenue should be raised through higher taxes which are distortionary or through
increased tax enforcement which increases the marginal effective tax rate as well as
consumes resources. Intuitivelyone would expect the latter to be the most costly
approach. The optimal tax problem is given by the Lagrange function
L = li( t,P,q,y,y) + b(g) + JL[T( t,P,q,y,y) - e - gJ.
The necessary conditions for a constrained optimum are found by setting the partial
derivatives with respect to the parameters t, P, e, y, y and g, equal to zero.
t: - rS(A2 + A3) + JL[¥tJ =?
P: - A3SR + JL[~ = O.
(35)
(36)
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A
(A2 + A3) + JL[~~ = o. (37)y:
y: A3+JL[~n =0. (38)
e: [[U(~) - u(c~)] + JL~ q'(e) = JL. (39)
g: b'(g) = JL. (40)
We have defined the Lagrange function L so that JLis a positive number. It now follows
directly from equations (35) to (39), that at the optimum, the government revenue
function must satisfy the following conditions
aTOf> o, (lender). aTOf < o, (borrower).
fJ> o. (41)
aT < o.
ay
aT < o.
ay
The first of these inequalities says that at an optimum, we should be on the increasing
part of the Laffer curve, when this is defined for each type of savings. Since the
consumer's welfare is decreasing with higher taxes, it can never be optimal to have
higher tax rates than necessary to achieve a certain level of public spending. The other
inequalities have similar interpretations and we will not elaborate on these.
In what follows we will discuss how taxes, public spending and tax enforcement should
be set optimally in two separate sections. The division is done partly to make the
analysis tractable and partly because the analysis logically can be done in two separate
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parts. The first section will examine the question of optimal taxes on savings, while the
second concerns the optimal size of the public sector as well as the optimallevel of tax
enforcement.
5. The Optimal Taxation ofSavings
In considering how taxes on savings should be set optimally, we write the first order
conditions (35), (36), (37) and (38) out in full as follows
t: - rS(A2 + Aa) + JL[rs + rt(åsjåt) + qRP(åSjåt)J = o. (42)
P: - AaSR + JL[rt(åsjåP) + qSR + qRp(åSjåP)J = o. (43)
y: (A2 + Aa) + JL[rt(åsjay) + qRP(aSjay) -lJ = o. (44)
y: Aa + JL[rt( asj ay) + qRP( aSj ay) - qJ = o. (45)
Multiplying equation (45) by SR and adding it to (43), we obtain
rt[asjap+ SR(asjay)] + qRP[aSjap+ SR(aSjay)] = o. (46)
Substitution of the Slutsky equations (22) and (26) into (46) yields
rtsp + qRPSp = O. (47)
By the same procedure, multiplying (44) by sr and adding it to (42), using the Slutsky
equations (23) and (25), we have that
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riSt + qRPSt = o. (48)
From (47) and (48), then, we can conclude that one solution to the problem is that
t = P = o. That is, when lump sum taxes are feasible, it is in general not optimal to tax
savings. Hence, the introduction of uncertainty and tax evasion in the context of
savings produce results similar to those of optimal commodity taxation. In the context
of savings, the result is in accordance with Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) who have
shown that lump sum taxes are the first best choice in an intertemporal model of
savings and certainty.
These results are first best in the sense that we have assumed the use of lump sum
transfers. If lump sum transfers are not available, equations (44) and (45) are
eliminated, and optimal tax rates are characterized by equations (42) and (43).
Assuming initially that cross price effects are zero, equations (42) and (43) can be
rewritten as
(49)
(50)
where c denotes the uncompensated own price elasticity6.
6The own price elasticities are defined as
It should be noted that the signs of the own price elasticities are ambiguous.
-91-
Equations (49) and (50) are the well known inverse elasticity rules in the case of
savings, stating that the asset with the lowest own price elasticity of demand should be
taxed highest, minimizing the allocative distortion imposed by taxation. This result,
however, is reversed if savings should be subsidized. In the case of domestic savings we
see by examining (49), that if c is negative, domestic savings should be subsidized if
ss
the demand for savings decreases as income (y) increases (inferior "goods"). This result
follows directly from equation (44). Turning to the taxation of foreign savings,
examination of (50) together with (45) reveals that if ess is negative, foreign savings
should be subsidized provided it decreases as income (y) increases. If both types of
savings are normal "goods" according to the definition in (30), the sign of the tax rate
on foreign savings depends on the relative magnitude of parameters normally
determined in a general equilibrium framework as well as on the relative size of the
income effects.
When cross price effects are different from zero, the general conditions for optimal
taxation of capital become more complicated. Following Diamond (1975), we define "/
as the social marginal utility of income. "/ is defined for each category of lump sum
income as
1= (Å2 + Å3 - IL) + p,[tr( Os/ ay) + qPR( OS/ ay)],
'1 = (Å3 - p,q) + p,[ tr( os/ ay) + qPR( os/ ay)].
The general condition for the relative size of optimal taxes on savings can now be
written as
t =!1!1[rsi'SP - RSjSP].P r Rc;;,A ASA
AJ ,St - rs"/ t
(51a)
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The general case as stated by (51a), is very complicated and depends on the relative
size of compensated own and cross price effects as well as on the relative size of the two
expressions for social marginal utility of incomet. It provides very little intuitive insight
into the structure of taxation, and no easy comparison can be done with the case of
zero cross price effects.
The general case, however, can be stated in an alternative way. Using the symmetry
conditions of the expenditure function we have that
{Jr _ _ a2 - -NIw = rA lSp = Mt = RSt,
where A :: A3/(A2 + A3)'
Using these conditions, the optimal tax formulae for each type of savings can be
written as
(51b)
(51c)
These conditions have a striking similarity to the familiar Ramsey rule in optimum
commodity taxation. There are, however, two differences. From the left hand side of
7From the two expressions of social marginal utility of income it follows directly that
1>;Y ::} [A2 + Jl(q -1)] + Jh't[(&/ ay) - (&/BY)] + p,qRP[(as/ ay) - (as/ ay)] > o.
+ + +
As can be seen from this expression, it is not clear whether the inequality really holds.
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both equations we notice that ,X appears in the numerator. The Ramsey rule has only
tax rates in the numerator in addition to the compensated substitution effects. Second,
the Ramsey rule states that the proportionate reduction of compensated demand should
be the same for all goods. This is not the case in (51b) and (51c). In general it seems
unlikely that 1= '}', hence, only by coincidence would the right hand side of the
equations be equal (1'x = '}'). The formulae, therefore, contrast the Ramsey rule by
stating that the relative decrease in compensated demand following on the tax change
(weighted by ,X) should be different for foreign and domestic savings.
Summarizing the results above, it is not necessarily so that (51b) and (51c) provide
more insight into the structure of taxation than (51a). We can, then, conclude that the
general case does not lend itself easily to interpretation.
6. The Optimum Probability and Size o/the Public Sector
Rewriting the first order conditions for e and g, we have
e: (39)
g: b'(g) = p,. (40)
Equation (40) derives the condition for the optimal size of public spending. We see that
the marginal utility from public spending should equal the marginal cost of public
funding. That is, the size of the public sector should be expanded until the marginal
utility from expansion equals the marginal cost caused by a larger public sector.
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Rearranging equation (39), the first order condition for tax enforcement can be written
as
q'(e) = Il-/[[U(~) - U(C~)] + Il-~' (52)
This condition says that it is worthwhile to spend some resources on tax enforcement,
which is costly, instead of providing public consumption solely by raising taxes. In
other words, increasing public revenue through higher taxes causes a distortion which is
larger than raising the level of tax enforcement.
The Lagrange multiplier Il- in equation (52) is the marginal cost of public funds. The
smaller Il- is, the more should be spent on tax enforcements. Likewise, the greater the
return to tax enforcement is, that is, the more one obtains from increasing the
probability of detection, the more should be spent on enforcement. The reason being
that more enforcement buys more public consumption and/or a reduction in distortion.
The difference in utility between the two states as expressed in the denominator is
negative, so the greater the difference is, the less should be spent on enforcement. A
large difference indicates that the penalty is already quite high and, hence, that
enforcement should be reduced since both parameters work to deter tax evasion.
Since q( e) is a continuous and differentiable function it has an inverse function which
describes the cost of tax enforcement as a function of the probability of detection.
Using (52), we can write the inverse as
8This is easily seen by realizing that
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e'( q) = [u(~) - u( c~)]/ Jj + ~. (53)
To proceed, we now multiply (45) by [u(c~) - U(~)]/A3' and add it to (53). By using
the Slutsky equations (24) and (27), several terms cancel and we are left with
e'( q) = rtsq + qRPSq - y + SRP - (q/ A3)[ u( c~) - u( ~)]. (54)
The last term on the right hand side can be approximated by a Taylor expansion as
u(4) - u( c~) = u,( ~)( c~ - ~) + (1/2)u"( 4)(c~ - C~)2.
Since 4 - ~ = SRP - y, and u,(~) = (A3/q) from the maximization of (1) subject to
(2), (3) and (4), we can rewrite (54) as
(55)
which says that at the optimum, the marginal cost of increasing q should equal the
marginal tax revenue net of the money necessary to keep the evader at a constant
utility level plus a term reflecting the degree of risk aversion by the consumer. This
optimum condition is similar to that of Sandmo (1981) which models tax evasion in the
context of labor supply and income tax evasion. As shown by Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(1987), the optimum condition for tax collection in this case can also be given the
interpretation that at the margin, the marginal cost of increasing the probability of
detection should equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in the exposure of
risk.
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7. Concluding Remarks
We have examined some comparative static properties of taxation as well as optimum
taxation in a model of capital tax evasion. A focal point of the analysis has been to
establish the requirement for an interior solution in which the choice of optimal tax
rates induce the consumer to save both abroad and at home. As already pointed out,
the model has several weaknesses. One important weakness is that individuals are
identical. As a consequence the analysis is solely concerned with the efficiency of
taxation. One possible extension of the model, therefore, is to allow individuals to be
different so that equity aspects of taxation can be studied.
Another problem of the model is that of moral and justice. There is no doubt that a
penalty could have been found that would have deterred tax evasion. Such a penalty,
however, would probably not be perceived as justifiable by the seriousness of the
offense. Second, a very high penalty conflicts with preferences for income inequality.
These two problems suggests that more attention should be devoted to the treatment of
justice and morality in a broader sense than this model suggests. A third expansion of
the model would be to analyse capital tax evasion in a general equilibrium model with
tax competition. The perspective of tax competition would probably instigate the
simultaneous application of game theory. Countries could then be seen as tax havens
with bank secrecy laws trying to maximize the net stock of capital taking into
consideration capital inflow as well as capital flight. This approach could hopefully add
realism to the model.
-97-
Appendix A
In this section we will state the Slutsky equations &sf åq and åSf åq, derived by
differentiating the first order conditions as given by equations (6) and (7).
~=,1,[U'(C~)[V"(Yl)[R - r(l- t)] + qu"(c~)RP(l + r(1-t))2]
+ u'(q) [v"(Yl)[r(l - t) - R(l- P)] + (1 - q)u"(c~)RP(l + r(l - t))2]]. (Al)
~ = ,1, [U'( c~) [V"(Yl) [r(l - t) - R] + qu"( 4)(1 + r(l - t))(l + R(l - P))( - RP)]
+ u'(q)[v"(Yl)[R(l-P) - r(l-t)] + (1- q)u"(c~)R(l + r(l-t))[-RP]]]. (A2)
Examining equations (AI) and (A2), we see that &sfåq > O and åSfåq < O, if R ~ r
and an interior solution exisits in which R(l - P) < r(l - t) < R.
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AppendixB
In this appendix we show the Slutsky equations derived from differentiating the first
order conditions (6) and (7). We will not show the calculations only the final results.
The effect of changes in y on savings can, thus, be written as
~ = rill [qu"( c~) [V"(Yl)( R(l - P) - 1\1 - t))
Oy
+ (1 - q)u"( c~)(-R2P)(1 + 1\1 - t))J].
as
ay = lill [qU"(~)[V"(Yl)[1\I- t) - R(l- P)]
+ (1 - q)u"( c~)R2P(1 + 1\1 - t))J].
(Bl) is positive and (B2) is negative if R ~ r and we have an interior solution.
(Bl)
(B2)
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ChapterS
OPTIMALINCOMETAXATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY*
Abstract
This paper considers how a linear income tax should be set optimally when individuals
are internationally mobile. The model is one where individuals can choose which
country to work in based on preferences for consumption and leisure. The optimum tax
analysis is founded on a social welfare function which reflects labor mobility by using
endogenous welfare-weights. Within this context, the discussion of the optimal income
tax is organized from two perspectives. The first relates to the optimum income tax
when a uniform lump sum transfer is used while the second concerns the optimal rate of
tax when a transfer is used which depends on time spent in the taxing jurisdiction.
*1 owe special thanks to Agnar Sandmo, David Wildasin, Vidar Christiansen, Heine Rasmussen,
Morten Berg and BjOrn Sandvik.
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OPTIMALINCOMETAXATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to present an analysis of optimal income taxation when
labor is mobile across countries. Although economists have lately realized that the
effects of tax policy in an open economy may differ from those in a closed economy, the
literature on taxation of labor income in an open economy is scarce. A large part of the
modern work done in this area belong to one of two categories: (i) those studying the
effects of migration on optimal taxation, and (ii) those examining the implications of
tax harmonization for labor mobility. The first category has as its focal point the brain
drain from underdeveloped countries [Bhagwati and Wilson (1989)]. This literature is
concerned with the loss of tax revenue and human capital that developing countries
suffer when highly qualified people migrate. Among the measures proposed to
neutralize the effects of migration is the taxation of the emigrant's foreign income
[Bhagwati (1980)]. The second category contains to this author's knowledge only one
work, that by Ulph (1987). Ulph studied the requirements for efficient international
taxation of workers who live in one country and work in another.
The present paper differs from the works above in two respects. First, it models labor
mobility in a partial equilibrium framework where each worker decides where to work
based on his preferences for consumption and leisure. The structure of the model,
therefore, is similar to the basic model of labor supply in a one country setting where
the individual is maximizing a utility function defined over net income and leisure
[Robbins (1930); Cooper (1952)]. Second, in contrast to the literature concerned with
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migration from developing countries, the paper only analyzes how taxes should be set
optimallyon domestic income. Implicit in this approach is the recognition that
international income tax coordination may be difficult or even unwanted by some
nations. To simplify the model, we assume that workers can move between countries at
no cost. Obviously, this is a weakness of the model and reflects the difficulty of
incorporating all effects that play a role in migration decisions. The outline of the
paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of labor mobility, while section 3
studies how a linear income tax should be set optimally when labor is- internationally
mobile. In particular, we examine how a linear income tax should be set optimally
when the government can redistribute income by: a uniform lump sum transfer or, a
uniform social insurance transfer which depends on time spent in a country. Finally,
section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
The model to be employed analyses work and leisure decisions between two countries
called the home and the foreign country. In line with the convention in trade theory,
capitalletters will denote variables pertaining to the foreign country. The economy we
consider consists of n individuals who can allocate time, t. ,T. , between the home anda a
the foreign country. Let n denote the total number of hours available. The time
constraint of each individual can then be written as
t. + T. = n.
I I
(1)
The consumer can allocate his time in each country between leisure, I ,F. , and labor
I I
time, l. , L. , so that
I I
-104 -
l. + f = t ..
I I I
(2a)
L.+F.=T ..
I I I
(2b)
We assume that the consumer can choose continuously between the two countries
where to allocate his labor and leisure time. There are several ways of interpreting this
flexibility. One is to view the choice of time spent in each country in a 'lifelong
perspective. The time constraint, n, can then be interpreted as the number of years
available before retirement. The individual must decide on how many years of his life
to stay abroad versus domestically, before retirement. Such choices are not uncommon
and are exemplified by guest workers who stay for a limited period of time abroad to
earn higher incomes than what would otherwise have been possible. Another
interpretation of the model, more in line with standard theory of labor supply, is to
accept that individuals can continuously choose between countries where to work.
Certainly this is true for some occupations such as academics, physicians and other
highly skilled workers. Moreover, federation of states such as the U.S. and the
European Community's internal market, allows unrestricted labor mobility. The
model, therefore, can be seen as picturing a well functioning internationaliabor market.
To proceed, we assume that working hours are fixed and a fraction (rp. ,4>.) of time
I I
spent in each country. Thus,
l.=rp.t ..
I I I
f = (1 - rp.)t ..
I I I
(3a)
L.=4>.T ..
I I I
F. = (1 - 4> .) T..
I I I
(3b)
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As seen by (3), the freedom of an individual to vary working hours is restricted within
each country. The constraint on choice may be perceived as a case where the working
hours are fixed by the employer for a particular job and that the worker cannot change
his occupation. Another interpretation is to see the fixed coefficients as institutional
constraints. For example, working hours may be determined by labor unions or by
government rules and legislation in each country. Note that compared to standard
models of income taxation and labor supply where labor time is chosen freely, the fixity
of labor time may appear to constrain the choice of the individual considerably. The
individual, however, enjoys some flexibility. By changing his allocation of time between
the two countries, the consumer is able to choose between a number of points on the
budget line. Moreover, in a world of many nations, all with different working
regulations, the individual is offered an almost continuous work schedule.
From (1) and (3) it can be seen that the choice of t. implicitly determines total time,
abroad as well as labor time and leisure in each country. Since labor time is a fixed
proportion of time in each country, the individual cannot spend time in a particular
country without working some amount of the total time. This is clearly an assumption
not in line with reality since people do occasionally spend their leisure time away from
their work place. As will turn out shortly, the assumption of fixed coefficients is vital
to the model in assuring an interior solution and, therefore, also a weakness of the
model.
The consumer has preferences defined over amounts of consumption and leisure. We
assume that the utility from leisure is the same across countries. It could equally well
have been the case that the consumer derived higher utility from leisure in one country
than the other. Thus, this assumption is simply a matter of taste, and the fundamental
results of the model are not changed by this assumption.
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Individuals: preferences are the same and the utility function is given by
r} = U(c., f + F.) = U(c., (4).- <p.)t. + (1- 4> .)n).
I I I I I II I
(4)
The utility function has the usual properties of strict quasi-concavity and
differentiability.
The consumer receives a social insurance transfer (a, A) in proportion to total time
spent in each country. If we perceive the model as portraying work decisions before
retirement, the inclusion of a social insurance transfer may be seen as some sort of a
pension scheme. Thus, by allocating part of his time abroad, the consumer would loose
some pension benefits in the home country. Since migration decisions have an effect on
future public pensions, the inclusion of social insurance transfers, means that the model
becomes more realistic.
Note that there are several other ways in which we could have made the consumer
eligible for the social insurance payment. For example, we might have related the social
insurance transfer to total income in a lifelong perspective, <p. t. w. , or total working
I I I
time, <p. t. , instead of total time spent in a country, t .. The approach chosen reflects a
I I I
stronger preference for equity than the others since it makes everyone eligible for the
transfer independent of ability or income. Many countries provide social insurance to
housewives and other groups of society which are not part of the formal sector, and the
use of t. allows us to incorporate this feature.
I
Each worker's marginal productivity is denoted, w. , W.. Both economies are
I I
characterized by perfect competition and consumption is the numeraire so, W., W., are
I I
the wage rates. The consumer's budget constraint now becomes
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c. = w. cp. t. [3 + t. a + b + W. eI>. T. B + T. A,
I I II I I I I I
(5)
where ([3, B) denote the marginal after tax rates in each country and b is a lump sum
transfer provided by the home country.
As seen by (5), the consumer is taxed according to the source principle, that is,
economic activities carried on within a particular country are subject to taxation only
in the country where the income is derived. There are two reasons for adopting source
taxation in this model. First, since the consumer may be seen as making decisions in a
lifelong perspective, the tax legislation in most countries would imply source taxation.
Second, most countries apply residence taxation with a limited tax credit for foreign
taxes paid. The limited tax credit, however, leads to source taxation when the foreign
tax rate exceeds the domestic tax rate.
The consumer's maximization problem is to find the allocation of time between the two
countries that yields the highest possible utility. The problem would appear to be to
maximize (4) subject to the multiple constraints (1) and (5). There is, however, really
one basic constraint since the choice of t. determines T.. We can, thus, restate the
I ,
individual's problem by the indirect utility function as
11'(.) = max Ui(c., (eI>. - cp.)t. + (1 - eI> .)0)
t ' I I I IC ., .
I I
s.t. c. = t.(w. cp. [3 + a) + b + (O - t.)( W. eI>. B + A).
I III I II
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The first order condition is
. .
~(w. <p.,B + a- W. q,. B - A) + U;(q,.- <p.) = O.
• I • • • I
(8)
Rearranging (8) we obtain
(W. q,. B + A - W.<p.,B
___ ~I __ ~Z ~I~I _
U; (q,. - <p.)
I I
a)
(9)
At the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
equals the net economic gain from spending an extra unit time abroad in terms of the
net-working requirement abroad. The first order condition is all but trivial, depending
on eight different parameters.
The first order conditions characterize an interior solution. It is, therefore, important
to check whether tax rates, wages and work hours are such that an interior solution can
indeed be the optimal. Suppose initially that q,. = <p. = <p for all i and that T. = o.
I I I
Then, from (8) it follows that
w. <p ,B + a > W. <p B + A.
I I
(10)
Equation (10) states that for time spent abroad to be zero, the economic compensation
per unit time in the home country must exceed that of the foreign country. Equal
working hours, therefore, lead to a corner solution where the consumer works in the
country providing the best financial compensation. Thus, for an interior solution to
occur, working hours must be different across countries. The best way of seeing this is
by assuming that q,. =f <p. and T. = o. From (8), then, we obtain
I I I
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U~ (w.~. B +A - w. cp. /3 - a)_. > I I I I if ~. > cp .. (11a)
U' (~. - cp.) I I1 I I
U; (w. e B +A - w. cp. /3 - a)_.< I I I I if ~. < cp .. (11b)
U' (~. - cp.) I I1 I I
Equation (11) gives the requirements for a corner solution in which the consumer
spends all his time domestically. The left hand side of equation (11a) and (Hb) is the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption - which is positive.
Note that a corner solution can only be assured from (Ha). This occurs when the right
hand side becomes negative and the home country has the shortest working day as well
as the best economic compensation per unit time. Thus, from (11) it follows that a
requirement for an interior solution is that the country with the highest economic
compensation has the longest work day.
To derive comparative static properties of the model we use the expenditure function
approach. The purpose of the analysis is to investigate the properties of the Slutsky
equations for time supply. Since the consumer's allocation of time must add to fl, a
change in time spent in one country will lead to exactly the opposite change in time
spent in the other country. It follows immediately that we need only investigate the
Slutsky equation for time supply in the home country.
Let b be the minimum expenditure required to achieve utility level D', The relationship
between compensated and uncompensated supply at utility level V is then
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t .((3 ,B ,a, A,q,. ,<p., "&) = t.((3 ,B ,a, A,q,. ,<p.,b),
I " • I I
(12)
where (A) denotes compensated time supply, and b is the lump sum income needed to
reach utility level tr, that is,
b( . ) = min c. - t.( w. <p.(3 + a) - (O - t.) ( W. q, . B + A)
I Il. I I1
s.t. cf(c., (q,. - <p.)t.+ (1 - q, .)(0 - t.» = "&.
I I • I I I
Taking the derivative of (12) and using the expenditure function, the Slutsky equations
are found as
åt. åt. åt.
• I I-=-+ w.<p.t.-.
å(3 å(3 I I Iåb
(13)
åt. åt. åt .
_I = _I + W.e (O - t.)_'.
BB BB I I I åb
(14)
åt. åt. åt.
_I = _' + t.-'.
åa åa I åb
(15)
åt. åt. åt.
_I = _I + (O - t.) _'.
åA åA I åb
(16)
åt. åt. åt .
_I = _I + t.( w. (3 - C17r.)_'.
å<p . å<p. I I I åb
I 1
(17)
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å t i å ti' åt i
- = - + (O - t.)( W. B -l1?r.)-,
~.~. " , åb, ,
(18)
where ?r. is the Lagrange multiplier pertaining to the expenditure minimization
I
problem.
The Slutsky equations depend on the relative magnitudes and signs of the income and
substitution effects. There are no a priori restrictions on the sign of the income effect
implied by theory. If we apply the conventional assumption that leisure is a normal
good, then
åU + F.) å((q,. - cp.)t. + (1 - q,.)0), '= I I I I > O.
åb åb
By using the chain rule we find that the sign of the income effect is given by the
condition
åt.
(q,. _ cp.)-' > O.
, , åb (19)
Equation (19) indicates that if leisure is a normal good, then depending on the relative
length of the work day in each country, either domestic or foreign time will be an
inferior good. If domestic time is a normal good, then domestic leisure as well as labor
are normal goods while foreign labor and leisure ar inferior goods. Compared to
standard theory of labor supply where labor is assumed to be inferior, the deviation
from the convention may seem awkward. The reason for the departure is simply that
the fixity of the workday implicitly determines the normality and inferiority of goods.
From a principal point of view there is nothing wrong with labor and leisure being
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inferior in one country and not in the other since a good never is inferior on its own,
but is inferior relative to a given preference ordering.
Turning to the compensated price effects, we see from (5) that an increase in /3, cp. or a
a
has the same effect as an increase in the wage rate. In the traditional model of labor
supply we know that the compensated supply of labor increases when the wage rate
rises. The intuition being that since labor is supplied and leisure demanded, a wage
increase makes it more expensive to spend leisure and more profitable to work. The
general result, however, does not easily carryover to our model with two countries.
This can be seen by initially considering the case when labor time is not fixed. An
increase in say the domestic wage rate would, in accordance with standard labor
theory, lead to an increase in time spent domestically since the price of leisure does not
differ across countries.
The introduction of fixed working hours complicates the standard result since leisure
cannot be chosen freely. Once the consumer allocates his time in a given country, his
work hours and leisure time are determined. A partial increase in the wage rate is now
made up of two relative prices, one for economic compensation between the two
countries and one for leisure. As previously, a wage increase makes it more profitable to
work and less favorable to spend leisure. Thus, a domestic wage increase makes it more
attractive to work in the home country and more expensive to spend leisure. Note that
the substitution effect is only positive if leisure is in short supply in the home country
since it then becomes relatively more expensive both to work and spend leisure abroad.
In all other cases the sign is indeterminate depending on the relative magnitudes of the
two price effects. Consider, for example, the ease when leisure is abundant in the home
country. Since it becomes more expensive to spend leisure, the consumer wants to
spend more time in the foreign country. At the same time economic compensation
becomes relatively better domestically and leads the consumer to prefer working at
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home. The outcome of the wage increase, therefore, depends on the relative size of
these two effects. Formally we have
åt.
-'>0,
åØ
åt.
-'>0,
åa
åt.
-'>0 ,
å<p.,
if q,. < cp. ,, , (20)
and
åt.
-' < O,
åB
åt.
-'<O ,
åA
åt.
-'<O,
aq,.,
if q,. > cp .., , (21)
The case shown in (20), which yields a positive substitution effect, implies a negative
income effect. We can, then, conclude that the signs of the Slutsky equations (13), (15)
and (17) are indeterminate. The same result is true for the Slutsky equations (14), (16)
and (18), where the substitution effect is negative while the income effect is positive.
From the discussion above it now follows that in general the total effect of changes in
the parameters of the model cannot be determined without further assumptions
regarding the relative magnitudes of substitution and income effects.
9. The Public Sector
The government is assumed to choose the parameters of the tax system so as to
maximize the welfare of its residents. Since this is a model of labor mobility in which
individuals can allocate time between two countries, we need to specify what we mean
by residency. That is, should the government maximize the utility of its citizens
regardless of where they live? In a model of tax competition one may perceive that the
utility of individuals is allowed in the welfare function regardless of residence. The
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home country, then, would engage in a battle with the foreign country to attract the
optimal number of taxpayers. Such a situation is quite similar to the median voter
model where tax policy is designed to attract the optimal size of voters.
The perspective of this paper, however, is different. We assume that the tax policy of
the foreign country is given exogenously. The game theoretic aspect of tax competition,
therefore, vanishes and the sole problem 'is to define whose utility to maximize. In the
literature on migration and income taxation the most common way to solve this
problem is by maximizing the utility of those left behind [Bhagwati and
Hamada (1989)]. In the traditional formulation, those left behind are assumed to be a
constant fraction of the population invariant to changes in tax parameters. Implicitly,
the assumption is that whatever policies lead to migration, no tax policy will ever make
the whole population migrate. In itself this is a strong assumption.
We will not adopt the conventional approach to the social welfare function. Instead, we
let each individual count in the welfare function according to the amount of time he
spends in the home country. The welfare weight may then be seen as emphasizing
seniorityover the life span of a consumer or simply reflect the choice of each consumer
at a certain point in time. Thus, the social welfare function can be written as
(22)
The use of time spent at home as the welfare weight is appealing since it takes into
account features from real life. In some countries a person looses his voting right if he
stays abroad too long. Although the loss of voting rights in real life happens
instantaneously, the model mimics real life fairly well by reducing the influence of a
person.
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Another implication of the choice of welfare weight is that it varies with different sets
of tax parameters. If we were to compare say the average welfare of individuals' under
one set of taxes to that under another set of taxes, we would in fact compare different
subsets of the population. The two subsets, therefore, are not comparable. If the
purpose of our study were to make such comparisons, this would certainly be a
weakness of the model. Our task, however, is to characterize optimal tax rates. Using t.,
as the welfare weight, therefore, seems reasonable.!
The public sector's tax budget constraint requires that total tax revenue be zero,
R((3, a, b) = E[(1- (3)w. cp. t.. , , , (23)
The optimization problem can now be formulated by means of the Lagrangian
where the first order conditions are given by2
aD. . at i -at. at.
1m" = EV' - + E w. A. cp. ~ + JL(l - (3)E w. cp. -' - JÆ w. cp. t. - JLaE -' = o. (24)
v I-' i a(3 '" , i ' 'a(3 i I , , i a(3
aD. . at. at. at.
!l::"" = E V' -' + EA. ~ + JL(l - (3) E w. cp. -' - JL Et. - JLa E -' = o. (25)
u a i Ba ' , i ' 'aa i ' i åa
aD. . at. at. at.
!:IT = E V' -' + EA. t. + JL(l - (3)E w. cp. -' - JLaE -' - nJL = o. (26)
u u i ab i' Z i ' 'ab i ab
lThe complexity introduced hy a welfare weight that is not invariant to changes in tax parameters
has hitherto heen overlooked in the literature on taxation and migration.
2From the indirect utility function it is easily seen that
av/ ab = Ai, where A is the Lagrange multiplier.
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In what follows it seems useful to organize the discussion of optimal tax rates from two
different perspectives. The first relates to the optimum income tax when a uniform
lump sum transfer is used. We know from theory that there is a distortion associated
with any redistribution of income from the more able to the less able. The distortion
arises since the government does not have at its disposal the information required to
make specific lump sum redistributions. The inherent distortion in redistributive tax
policies give rise to an equity - efficiency trade off. Our first task, therefore, is to
examine this trade off when the optimal marginal rate of tax is used in combination
with a uniform lump sum transfer.
The second perspective concerns the optimal marginal rate of tax when the government
prefers the use of a uniform social insurance transfer to the lump sum transfer. The
social insurance differs from the lump sum transfer by depending on time spent
domestically and is, therefore, distortionary. From an equity point of view, the
redistributive impact of the social insurance transfer is not clear. If ability is positively
correlated to time spent domestically, then, the social insurance transfer is a poor
redistributive device. A priori one would expect the optimal tax rate to entail some
correction formula which deals with the ambiguity of the social insurance transfer as a
redistributive device. From the perspective of tax policy, the use of a time dependent
transfer is interesting since it (a) clearly is feasible, and (b) may provide an answer to
whether the inclusion of a social insurance transfer impose less of a burden on the
optimal income tax than does the uniform lump sum transfer.
To arrive at our first optimal tax formulae we multiply (26) by }.;(w. cp. t.)/n2 and
. I I I
I
divide (24) by n. Note that since a = O, (25) is eliminated as well as the two last terms
in (24) and (26).
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Subtracting (26) from (24) we obtain
t.] [EW.
I + i I A. {fl. t~ EA. t. Ew. {nfl. ti.]I Yl I _ i I I. i I Y,
n n
(27)
Consider first the case when all individuals are equal, that is, A. = A , w. = w, <p. = <p,, , ,
and q,. = q, for all i. By equation (27) - using the Slutsky equation (13) - we obtain,
V(1-,8) = --op,w<p
V Rb = -_·t +-.p, n \ -I!!.1\ - t" (28)
Quite unexpected, then, the optimal tax policy when individuals are equal entails the
use of both the income tax and the lump sum transfer. In particular, the home country
should subsidize work domestically through the income tax in combination with a
uniform lump sum tax. This result has a very natural interpretation. Since the social
welfare function maximizes the individual's indirect utility function weighted by time
spent domestically, social welfare is increased by inducing the consumer to spend more
time domestically. Thus, work should be subsidized. If the government budget is to be
balanced, tax revenue must be collected in the most efficient way. As a consequence, a
lump sum tax is levied which is neutral with respect to the individuals marginal
evaluation of time spent domestically.
Note that this conclusion hinges on the assumption that the utility of the consumer is
positive (V > O). If his utility is negative, then, the policy recommendations are
reversed. The the consumer should now be taxed so as to minimize his stay in the home
country. Obviously, the equivocal impact of tax policy is a weakness of the model and
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due to the endogenous welfare weight. To avoid the problem, it is necessary to restrict
the utility of individuals to positive values. This is a strong assumption. The problem
with endogenous welfare weights, however, is inherent in the whole literature on
migration and can only be avoided by having constants as welfare weights. The
difficulty with this approach is that one has to find a social criterion for setting the
welfare weight - for example, by defining a part of the population spending sufficient
time domestically regardless of tax policy to be included in the social welfare function -
Le. one adopts the principle of maximizing the utility of those left behind. Clearly, this
approach has some major conceptual difficulties as well. Using constants as welfare
weights, the optimal choice for raising tax revenue is to set (3 = 1, fr = RI n and J.t = A.
Thus, the externality from endogenous welfare weights that yielded distortionary
taxation disappears and the conventional result from the closed economy case appears
(Dixit and Sandmo (1977)).
To proceed, we simplify the notation and the interpretation of the next formula by
using Diamond's definition of the social marginal utility of income ,,/, as
at.[ . ]
f. - A. t. + -' V' + J.t( (1 - (3)w. cp. .
• •• ab I •
(29)
The social marginal utility of income to individual i is simply the gain in social welfare
from provision of an additional unit non-labor income. The welfare gain can be divided
into two effects, a direct and an indirect. The direct effect is, A. t. , which is the private• •
marginal value of income evaluated by the welfare weight. The indirect effects are
caused by the induced change in allocation of time due to the marginal increase in
at. .
non-labor income. They are; -'. 11', which is the marginal effect on social utility
ab at.
following the change in the welfare weight, and -' J.t(1 - (3)w. cp. , which is the induced
ab • •
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change in tax revenue valued at the marginal utility of income to the government.
Substituting the Slutsky equation (13) into (27) and solving for (1 - (3), the optimal
tax formula for the marginal tax rate can be written as 3
(1 - (3)
E åt i Vi
= _ !.___;_i _;;W=- !._co_v_(_w....;,.i_'P__;_i _t..;_i_'_'_I;_·).
~ E åti W. 'P. ~
i W I I
'{' åt.
LJ I w.<{J.
i pr I I
n
(30)
Note that the solution is not explicit since f3 appears on both sides. We can, however,
still gain some useful insights. The right hand side consists of two terms, both denoting
the equity - efficiency tradeoff. The denominator in both terms is the same and reflects
the efficiency concern which is the average compensated reduction in time spent
domestically measured in efficiency units. The equity concern in the last term is the
covariance between domestic labor income and the social marginal utility of income. In
general one would expect the covariance term to be negative. The numerator in the
first term is the average effect on social indirect utility from a compensated change in
the welfare weight. This term is specific to the open economy model in the sense that it
is an equity formula necessitated by the use of a tax dependent and residence based
welfare weight. As we have already noted, the substitution effect (åtl å(3), is of
indeterminate sign in this model unless (> < 'P, in which case the substitution effect is
positive. Since the substitution effect appears in both the numerator and the
denominator, the first term is of negative sign and, ceteris paribus, this is an argument
in favor of decreased taxation.
If we had chosen constants as welfare weights - as in the traditional literature - the
3See appendix A for the transition.
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first term would vanish, leaving only the last term behind. The optimal tax formula
then becomes almost similar to the optimal tax formula found by Dixit and
Sandmo (1977, eq. (16)), in a model for a closed economy. The difference between the
two models, then, is that the substitution effects in the open economy model are
expressed in terms of time and not labor, as is the case in the model by Dixit and
Sandmo. It seems reasonable to assume that the substitution effects are higher in the
open economy case implying lower taxes.
Turning to the case when the government uses a time dependent social insurance
transfer, equation (22) is eliminated. As in the case of the uniform lump sum transfer,
we can simplify the notation by defining::;. as the social marginal utility of income to
I
individual i, hence
at.[ . ]
::; . == ).. . t. - Il + -' V' + Il( 1- (3)w. <p. - Ila .
I " ab • I (31)
Compared to the definition in (29), the social marginal utility is slightly altered. In
addition to the previous formula we must now also account for the cost of providing the
at.
social insurance transfer Il, as well as the induced change in tax revenue -' a, from the
ab
social insurance transfer valued at the marginal cost of providing public funds.
To derive the optimal tax formula we multiply (25) by E(w. <p.)/n2, and divide (24) by
. • I
I
n. We then subtract the latter from the former using the Slutsky equations to obtain
the optimal tax formula+
4The transition has been relegated to Appendix B to leave the text as uncluttered as possible.
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[at . l1. l _i (pa - V)(1- Ø) = n i aø +
E E
cov( W. cp. , t. :y.)
I I I I, (32)
E
where we have defined E as
E - [1 \"'w.cp. ati 1 \"'w.cp. ati \"'w.CP.]= p - 1.. I I' _ - -2 1.. I .. _ • 1.. I I.
n . ~f.l n. a .
I Up I a I
(33)
The optimal marginal rate of tax now consists of three terms, all reflecting an
equity - efficiency trade off. As previously, the denominator denotes the efficiency
concern and is the same for all three terms. The efficiency concern now also takes into
account the distortion imposed by the social insurance transfer and is made up of an
averaged difference between the compensated substitution effect of the tax rate and the
social insurance transfer. A priori, one would expect the substitution effects to have the
same sign. If they do, then, from (33) we see that the two effects are counteracting.
Note that a decrease in the tax rate and an increase in the social insurance transfer
both induces the consumer to spend more time domestically. Thus, to minimize the
total distortion induced by taxation, the two effects should be opposing.
The equity concern as portrayed in the numerator of the last term on the right hand
side is almost similar to the previous tax formula. The numerator is now the covariance
between the wage rate measured in terms of the working requirement and the social
marginal utility of income weighted by domestic time. It is very difficult to say
whether the new way of expressing the covariance term implies a higher or lower
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covariance than in the previous case. The change, however, should not alter the sign
which is presumed to be negative.
The numerators in the two first terms on the right hand side are equity effects and
measure the average net effect on social welfare from a compensated change in time
spent domestically. As already noted, the substitution effects (åt/ å(3) and (åt/ åa) are
of indeterminate sign but are expected to have the same sign making the terms
counteracting. It is difficult to say whether the sum of the two first terms leads to a
reduction in the optimal tax rate. If (pa - V) is positive and the magnitude of the two
substitution effects are the same, one would expect the second term to overtake the
first term, thus, making the sum negative. Ceteris paribus, this is an argument in favor
of lowering the optimal marginal rate of tax. In general, however, the result is
indeterminate. A special case occurs if the two first terms cancel and only the last term
remains. The optimal tax formula, then, again inherits the same structure as that
found by Dixit and Sandmo (1977, eq. (16)).
An interesting question arises as to whether the use of a time dependent welfare weight
leads to a lower marginal tax rate than a uniform lump sum transfer. In contrast to the
lump sum transfer, the social insurance transfer allows the government to differentiate
the transfer between individuals based on time spent in the home country. However,
since this differentiation is not based on ability to pay higher taxes, it may not be a
very good redistributive device. By examining the optimal tax formulae in (30) and
(32), it seems difficult to argue that one tax formula leads to a higher optimal rate of
tax than the other. This conclusion may be disappointing but hardly surprising seen in
the context of other results in the optimal taxation literature.
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-I. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been twofold. First, we have developed a model where
labor is internationally mobile and examined some comparative static results. Second,
the analysis has examined how a linear income tax should be set optimally when
individuals can choose between countries where to work.
The model we have constructed is in line with conventional labor supply models where
each individual decides where to work based on his preferences for leisure and
consumption. The focal point of the model has been on an interior solution in which
after tax economic compensation and working hours are such as to induce the consumer
to work both abroad and at home. Such international flexibility is not common among
individuals but are true for certain types of highly skilled workers. The model
constructed suppresses many features which may be relevant to individuals who are
internationally mobile. One weakness of the model is that it does not take into account
moving costs or cultural differences between countries. Another weakness it that the
relative size of the public sector in a country does not matter for labor mobility.
Obviously, an extension of the model would be to allow the size of the welfare state to
influence the consumers choice of residency.
The second objective of the paper has been to find a formula for the optimal marginal
tax rate which highlights some of the problems encountered when labor is
internationally mobile. We assume that the government does not have at its disposal
the information required to make specific lump sum distributions, thus, the analysis
studies the equity - efficiency trade off from two different perspectives. In the first, the
government uses a uniform lump sum transfer in connection with the linear rate of tax,
while in the second, a residency based social insurance transfer is used instead of the
lump sum transfer. The latter approach makes it possible for the government to
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distinguish between individuals based on how much time they spend domestically. The
time dependent social insurance transfer, however, may not be a good redistributive
tool since ability to pay taxes is not necessarily positively correlated to time spent
domestically. Our examination of the optimal marginal rates of tax is inconclusive as to
whether one type of redistribution policy impose less of a burden on the income tax
than does the other.
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Appendix A
We here derive the first best solution using (24) and (26). We multiply (26) by
E(w. r.p. t.)/n2 and divide (24) by n. Subtracting (26) from (24) we obtain
. I I I
a
(AJ) I .at. . at.E V' I EV" E w. r.p.i W_i Ob.i I In n n t .] IEW.,\. r.p. t~I+illil n E x. t. Ew. Ill. ta.]. I I . a Ya1 ........1 _n n
IE W. Ill. ati E ati w. Ill. E W. Ill. t.]i a Yl W _ i Ob I Yl i I r, I+ /1(1 - (3) - . = O.n n n
at. at. at. at.
Using the Slutsky equation -' = -' + W. r.p. t.-', and denoting -':: s. , we rewrite the
a(3 a(3 '" ab a(3 ,
expression as.
IE(s . + w. r.p. t. ;;,pati vi) ~ T,i at i ~i' "I I.J V ~ I.J W. r.p.(A2) n - i nU() • i 'n ' t.], + cov( w. r.p. t. , '\. t.), " f I
I at -~(w. r.p. (s. + W. r.p. t. ve-i))1 , " '" 7f£)'+~1-(3) ---------n----~~ ~ at.I.J 'W. r.p.i7Jli "n _t _W_i ': _t i] =n O.
Rearranging the terms in the big brackets we obtain
IE d Etat. V'
. at.
t;]w. r.p.. , E V' ' Ei , + i , I 'Ob 7Jli w. r.p.(A3) i i , I + cov( W. r.p. t. , '\. t.)- .n n n n a f a I I
+ 1'(1 - p)lr w. r.p. s. E w. r.p. t at. . E at. E tI. I W. r.p. , w. r.p. w. r.p., , , i , I '7Jli' , i7Jli' , i , I I = O.+n n n n
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This expression can be rewritten as
(A4) It Si yi . åt ·1+ COv( W. <p. t., v' -') + COv( W. <p. t. , A. t.)n , "åb ' " "
It ». <Pi Si åt·1+ /1(1 - (3) ---- + cov( w. <p. t., w. <p. -') = O.n , " " åb
Combining the covariance terms we obtain
E S.v'i , t Wi <Pi Si
+ /1(1 - (3) --n- + COv( W. <p. t. , /,.) = O,
I " ,
(A5) n
where 'Y., åt .[ . ]- A. t. + -' v' + /1((1 - (3)w. <p.." åb ' ,
Solving for (1 - (3), the optimal tax formula becomes
(A6) (1 - (3) = 1
Jl
E åt i Vi
,. -mr 1 cov (w. <p. t. , ,.)
UjJ , " ,._--'-~ __- - - .__ --'-_--'-...:.....__'-
E åt i w. <p. /1
i7J!j' ,
~ åt.
lJ 'W.<p.i1!jT' ,
n
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AppendizB
To derive the optimal tax formula we multiply (25) by E(w. <(J.)/n2, and divide (24) by
. I I
I
n.
(Bl)
[~~hiE Eih]- ILa o o Wi<{Ji . oa- .~ =0.n n n
Substituting the Slutsky equations (13) and (15) into (1), and rearranging, we obtain
(B2) [
r(Vi(~ + Wi<{Jiti~)) _ r(Vi(~ + ti~)). ~Wi<{Ji]
n n n
[
E(~ + WOI/)·to~) EW'I/)' E(& + toati)]_ "a . l 'Yl lob o l 'Yl o oa llJb
fA' l _ .1 -O
n n n -.
By rearranging the big brackets and combining the covariance terms we obtain
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(B3)
Equation (B3) can be further simplified by realizing that some of the terms in the big
brackets can be expressed as covariance terms. Thus
(B4)
We define
as the social marginal utility of income to individual ifrom time spent domestically.
Combining all the covariance terms we have
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(B5) [
at. .at· l [at. at· l~Vi= ~VI~a ~Wil,Oi ~Wil,Oi= ~Wil,Oi~ ~Wil,Oi
l !!f!_ _ l (ja, l + J.L( 1_ (3) l !!f!_ _ l (ja ,-£..__
n n n n n n
[
~~ ~~ ~Wil,Oil N- Ila isæ: -~, + co·, W·(I'J· t·",·) = O
fA' n n n 11\ 1.,..1' l/l •
Rearranging,
(B6)
_ [rViW_ rVi~,~Wil,Oi l- _ - - co·, W·(I'J· t·~·)n n n 11\ 1.,..1, l J} ,
Salving for (1 - (3),
E E
- cov( w. 1,0. , t. ~n
I I I I,
E
where we have defined E as
E - [1 ~ W.(I'J. ati 1 ~ W.(I'J. ati ~ W.(I'J.]= J.L - L I"" I' - - -2 L I"" I' - ,L I"" In . !.lf.l n. a .
I UfJ I a I
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Chapter6
TAX DEDUCTION VERSUS TAX CREDIT:
THE CASE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM*
Abstract
This paper explores how the tax deduction scheme as opposed to the tax credit scheme
affects the behavior of a multinational firm. The paper demonstrates that: (1) the
double taxation implied by the tax deduction system does not necessarily impose more
of an anti-trade bias than does the tax credit system, (2) under the tax deduction
scheme, a government cannot influence the behavior of the firm and, thus, induces a
fiscal externality upon itself, (3) domestic and foreign tax policy have real effects when
the tax credit is applied - these effects are shown to depend on the first order condition
for trade between the parent firm and its foreign subsidiary.
*1 am grateful for remarks and comments made by participants at the Nordic Symposium on Tax
Policy in Open Economies held at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
lowe special thanks to Jan I. Haaland, Agnar Sandmo and Peter Birch SOrensen.
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TAX DEDUCTION VERSUS TAX CREDIT:
THE CASE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM
1. Introduction
In a world with free mobility of goods and factors, differences in national tax systems
can have substantial effects on the volume and pattern of international trade and, thus,
on nations I welfare. Most countries allow domestic firms to credit foreign taxes paid
against the domestic tax liability falling on foreign source income rather than simply to
deduct them as costs from taxable income. From a world perspective, the question
arises as to which tax system is preferred - the tax credit scheme or the tax deduction
scheme.
Musgrave (1969) concludes that capital exporting countries will prefer the tax
deduction system despite the double taxation on foreign source income that it implies.
He argues that the tax credit scheme is inferior since it surrenders more tax revenue to
the foreign country. Hamada (1966) finds that two countries, one investing in the other
are both better off under the tax credit system due to the efficient allocation of capital
under this scheme. More recently, Bond and Samuelson (1989) examine the two tax
schemes in a tax-setting game played by a capital exporting and a capital importing
country. They find, however, that both countries prefer tax deduction to tax credit due
to strategic forces arising in this game. These works all examine the question purely
from a macro point of view, that is, from the perspective of countries. Because the
microeconomics of the firm has been neglected, these studies are all carried out under
the conventional assumption that the tax deduction scheme introduces an anti-trade
bias because traded capital is subjected to double taxation.
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This paper addresses whether the tax deduction system really leads to an anti-trade
bias. To answer such a question one cannot examine countries but their agents - the
behavior of multinational firms. A simple model of a monopolistic firm selling to two
national markets simultaneously is used to examine the effects of the tax deduction
versus the tax credit system. Specifically, the objectives are twofold. The first is to
characterize the optimal strategy of the firm when faced with different ways of
alleviating double taxation. Does the tax deduction scheme induce the parent to export
less goods to the foreign subsidiary than does the tax credit scheme? The second is to
examine the effects of the tax deduction and the tax credit scheme from the perspective
of a nation and, to determine whether firms respond differently to tax policy under the
two tax schemes.
2. The Analytical Framework
The model to be employed is based on Horst (1971) and analyses a multinational firm's
choice of production levels, exports and transfer price between two countries called the
home and the foreign country. We assume that the firm is the sole owner of the
production plants in both countries. Capital letters denote variables pertaining to the
foreign subsidiary. We shall postpone the introduction of taxes and systems of taxing
foreign source income untillater and first outline the basic features of the model.
The multinational firm produces and sells a single product to two different countries.
The firm is a monopolist in both markets; Revenue and cost considerations are such
that the firm exports part of its production in the home country, z, to the foreign
country, and sets a transfer price, p, per unit on the exported quantity. The foreign
country levies an ad valorem tariff, T, on its import. Sales in each country (y, Y)
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depend only on the prices (q, Q) charged, so, y = y( q) and Y = Y( Q). Amounts of
production are denoted (x, X), and the cost functions are given by c(x) and C(X). We
assume that the firm faces increasing marginal costs of production. Total revenue in
each country is given by r(x - z) = yq and R(X + z) = YQ. The profit functions are
written as
7r = r(x- z) - c(x) + pz. (1)
II= R(X + z) - C(X) - p(l + r)z. (2)
To simplify the analysis we will not distinguish between profit taxes and dividend
taxes, but assume that all dividends must be repatriated immediately to the home
country. Hence, the corporate and the dividend tax can be consolidated into a single
effective rate of taxation denoted (t, T).
There are two jurisdictional principles for taxing international income, the source
principle and the residence principle. Under the source principle income is only taxed
within the jurisdiction it originates. The residence principle in contrast, subjects the
taxpayer to taxation in the country of residence on all his income regardless of
geographic source. Most countries apply the residence principle and the focus of this
paper will be on residence taxation when dividends are repatriated immediately) Since
income earned abroad is often taxed at source as well as in the country of residence,
double taxation occurs. There are three policy tools that tax authorities can apply to
alleviate double taxation; a tax credit, tax exemption and tax deduction. The tax
exemption method - just as the name indicates - exempts foreign source income from
lIn Europe, all countries except France and the Netherlands apply the residence principle. France
exempt from taxation foreign source income if it is derived by a french owned permanent
establishment. Dutch owned foreign subsidiaries are also tax exempt if they represent an investment
effectively linked with the business of the parent company and satisfy certain equity requirements
(see Giovannini (1990)).
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taxation in the country of residence. It is a special case of the tax credit and will not be
treated separately.
9. The Tax Credit System
The tax credit scheme is the most common way of alleviating double taxation on
repatriated foreign earnings. Under the tax credit scheme, the firm can credit foreign
taxes paid (7ll) against the domestic tax liability falling on the foreign source income
(tlr). Thus, total tax liability to the home country becomes (tlr - TIl). In most
countries the maximum allowable tax credit is the tax applied to the foreign income at
the home tax rate. As a consequence, the firm pays the highest of the foreign or the
domestic tax rate on its foreign source profits, and two different global after tax profit
functions arise,
v = 7r - tx + Il - TIl - (t - T)Il,
= (1 - t)(7r + II), if t ~ T, (3)
v = (1 - t)7r + (1 - T)Il, if t < T. (4)
The firm's maximization problem can be thought of as a sequential process where the
firm first finds the optimal transfer price and, then, given this price, decides on its
production and export levels. The two conditions for a positive optimal transfer price
are
~ = z(1 - t) [ - T] > 0, if t ~ T. (5)
av [~]ap= z(1- T) ~-T > 0, if t < T. (6)
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The results in (5) and (6) are both well known from Horst (1971). Equation (5) states
that when domestic and foreign income are subject to the same tax rate, transfer
pricing is never profitable if the tariff is positive. In this case the firm will choose the
lowest possible transfer price. Condition (6) indicates that when the term in the big
bracket is positive, that is, if the relative differential in tax rates between the
importing and the exporting country is greater than the importing country's tariff, the
firm will always choose the highest possible transfer price.? Hence, transfer pricing is
only profitable when domestic and foreign income carry different effective rates of tax.
Extremely high transfer prices are rarely observed in reallife. How, then, is the transfer
price -determined? The transfer pricing problem is the foreign government 's choice of a
rule for pricing traded goods between related parties. Income arising out of transactions
by related parties are often determined on an arm's length basis, that is, as if the
parties were not related. In this model, one possibility of finding an arm's length price
is to assume that the foreign government can observe the price charged in the domestic
market. There are, however, many reasons why this assumption may not hold. For
example, the parent firm may be able to at no cost attach a cosmetic feature to goods
exported so that they appear as different goods. Alternatively, the parent firm could
channel exports through a third firm not recognized by tax authorities as linked with
the parent firm. Since the possibilities offered to the firm of masking the real price of
the good exported are many, a more realistic assumption seems to be that the foreign
government only imperfectly can observe the domestic price. However, for the purpose
of this model, it does not seem useful to incorporate mechanisms for determining the
transfer price. To simplify the model, therefore, and in accordance with most of the
2Kant (1988a, 1988b) and Samuelson (1982) have examined how high a profitable transfer price is,
while Hines (1990) explores various ways of inducing the firm to set the proper transfer price from
the perspective of the government.
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literature, it is assumed that the transfer price is positive and that an upper bound
exists given by government rules and regulations.
Provided that the ad valorem tariff is positive, it follows from (5) and (6) that transfer
pricing occurs when t ~ T.The global after tax profit function in this case is
v= (1- t)[r(x- z) - c(x) + pz] + (1- T)[R(X + z) - C(X) - p(1 + T)Z].
The first order conditions with respect to x, X and z, are
~ = (1 - t) [r'(x- z) - c/(x)] = o.
~ = (1 - T) [R'(X + z) - C'(X)] = o.
~ = (1 - t) [p - r'(x- z) ] + (1 - T) [R'(X + z) - p(1 + T)] = O,
(7)
(8)
(9)
where the primes denote derivatives.
Equations (7) and (8) state that the firm decides its production level in each country
by equating marginal revenue to marginal costs. Note that the optimal level of
production in each country is a function of the level of exports since marginal revenue
changes when exports change. The condition for optimal exports is given by (9). It has
two interpretations. In the first, the multinational firm equates the net marginal gain
of exports by the parent firm (first term) to the net marginal loss of imports by the
foreign subsidiary (second term). The second interpretation is a reversal of the first.
The parent firm now equates the net marginal loss from exports (first term is negative)
to the net marginal gain of imports by the foreign subsidiary (second term is positive).
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We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied. It can be shown that if
(ril - e") < 0, (Ril - GI) < 0, [r", Ril) < 0, and (c", GI) > 0, the second order
conditions hold. 3
4. The Tax Deduction System
Under the tax deduction system, the country of residence allows the multinational firm
to alleviate double taxation by deducting foreign taxes paid (TIT) against taxable
income in the home country (7r + IT).Tax deduction does not provide a complete relief
from double taxation since part of the foreign income will be taxed twice, first in the
foreign country and then, in the home country.
Formally stated, the global after tax profit function under the tax deduction system is
v= 7r + Il - t7r- TIl - t(Il - TIl) = (1- t)[7r + (1- T)Il].
If the multinational firm can manipulate the transfer price, it is chosen according to
the sign of the expression
%¥ = z(1 - t) [T - r(l - T)]. (10)
The multinational firm, then, will set the transfer price as high as possible if the foreign
tax rate is greater than the part of the ad valorem tariff that the firm has to cover
itself. Put differently, transfer pricing occurs when the domestic tax rebate exceeds the
cost of transfer pricing. Compared to the tax credit case, the transfer pricing condition
depends solelyon the relative size of foreign tax parameters. This induces a fiscal
3For a more detailed discussion of the second order conditions see appendix A.
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externality on the home country if it chooses the tax deduction scheme over the tax
credit scheme. The externality is seen by realizing that the foreign country by changing
its tariff or tax rate, can alter the transfer pricing behavior of the firm. By doing so,
the foreign country changes taxable revenue in the home country. For example, by
setting the ad valorem tariff equal to the ratio of the tax rate to the after tax rate,
r = T/(l - T), the foreign country induces the firm to charge the lowest possible
transfer price+ As a consequence, the home country gains no tax revenue from exports.
Note that the fiscal externality disappear if the foreign country imposes a unit tariff on
imports. The condition for a positive transfer price now becomes: z(1 - t) T > O, and
only if the foreign country sets its corporate tax rate equal to zero can it induce the
parent firm to charge the lowest possible transfer price.s A zero corporate rate of tax,
however, is hardlya realistic alternative.
The global after tax profit function is
v = (1 - t){ r(x - z) - c(x) + pz + (1 - T) [R(X + z) - C(X) - p(l + r)z]}.
Provided transfer pricing occurs, the first order conditions with respect to x, X, and z,
are6
~ = (1 - t) [r'(x- z) - c'(x)] = O. (11)
4It should be noted that it may not be optimal for the foreign country to set its tax parameter in
such a way as to minimize the transfer price.
5The global after tax function of the firm in the case of a unit tariff is
v = (1 - t)(r - c - pz + (1 - T)(R - C - pz - rz».
The condition for a positive transfer price becomes
{)v//)p = z(l - t)T > O.
6The second order conditions are given in appendix B.
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~ = (1 - T)(l - t) [R'(X + z) - C'(X)] = o. (12)
%¥ = (1 - t) [p - r'(x - z) ] + (1 - t)(l - T) [R'(X + z) - p(l + r)] = O. (13)
Production levels are found by equating marginal revenue to marginal costs. The
production decision, therefore, is in principle analog as to those found in the tax credit
case. Similarly, the the condition for optimal exports (13), states that the net marginal
gain from exports by the parent firm should be equal to the net marginal loss from
imports by the foreign subsidiary and vice versa. As expected, the net marginal loss
(gain) from .importing is less in the tax deduction case since foreign source income is
taxed twice, first by the foreign and then by the domestic rate of tax. Thus, by
comparing (9) to (13), the analysis leads us to conclude that zd r. zc' where subscripts c
and d denote the tax credit and the tax deduction case respectively. Thus, production
and sales also differ under the two tax systems.
The double taxation induced by the tax deduction scheme has lead many economists to
conclude that tax deduction leads to an anti-trade bias. Moreover, tax deduction is
used by some countries as a special means to prevent transfer pricing behavior by
multinational firms." The supposition is that tax deduction by imposing double taxation
reduces the incentive by the firm to transfer income from the home country to its
foreign subsidiary. In the next section we will examine this question in greater detail.
7The most prominent example is the Norwegian petroleum tax law which only allows multinational
oil companies operating on the continental shelf to deduct foreign taxes paid against Norwegian
taxable income. This contrasts the practice on the mainland where the tax credit method is granted.
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5. Profit Shifting: A Numerical Example
The concern over tax arbitrage from high to low tax countries has lead some countries
to apply the tax deduction method when taxing multinationals. According to
conventional wisdom, the double taxation of foreign source income makes it favorable
for the multinational firm to shift profits from the foreign subsidiary to the parent
firm. Thus, exports and as a consequence tax revenue in the home country should be
higher in the tax deduction case. To gain some insight as to whether the conventional
intuition holds we must compare the conditions for optimal exports under the two
schemes. Unfortunately, such an exercise does not yield any conclusive results. To
proceed, therefore, we construct a numerical example to investigate which tax system
lead to the highest level of tax arbitrage.
As previously, we assume that the revenue of the firm depends on the amount it
chooses to supply. There is a linear inverse demand curve in both countries written as
q(y) = a - by, (14a)
Q( Y) = A - BY, (14b)
where (A, a) and (B, b) are constants. The revenue function in each country is now
defined as
r(y) = q(y)y = ay-:- by2 = a(x- z) - b(x- z)2. (15a)
R( Y) = Q( Y) Y = AY - BYl = A(X + z) - B(X + Z)2. (15b)
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To simplify the maximization problem of the firm we assume that marginal costs are
constant in the foreign country and increasing in the domestic country. Thus,
c(x) = x2, (16a)
C(X) = [(X, (16b)
where K is a constant.
The two profit functions are given by
7r = a(x- z) - b(x- Z)2 - x2 + pZ.
IT = A(X + z) - B(X + z)2 - [(X - p(l + T)Z.
Examining the tax credit case first, we know from above that for transfer pricing to
occur, the global after tax profit function must be written as
v= (1- t)7r + (1- T)IT.
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
(17)
(18)
Z - p( 1 + b) - a ->....=( 1;_-",T)::....L..l..:{1~+ .-7b+,)(..::..;[(~-L...lp{.,.=.l_+___;_T).L.J..)c- 2b +- 2b(1-t) (19)
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Turning to the tax deduction system, the the global after tax profit function is
v= (1- t)[7r+ IT- m] = (1- t)[7r+ (1- T)IT].
The first order conditions are
(20)
(21)
_ p( 1 + b) - a "-.::(1;.....___;T)::.....u...;( 1::........;..+__;b~)+=p;~(_---l:....lp(._::.I_+;____.:_TLJ._))
zd - 2b + - 2b (22)
Subtracting (19) from (22), we obtain
_ _ (1 + b)(1 - TH[( - p(1 + T))t
Zc zd - 26 ( 1- t) (23)
The question now, is, what values we must impose on the parameters for the tax
deduction system to imply the highest level of profit shifting from the foreign country
to the home country. From (23) we see that exports are higher under the tax deduction
scheme if the following inequality is satisfied
Zc < zd :} K < p(1 + T).
From the first order conditions (8) and (12) we know that C'(X) = R'( Y) in optimum.
Since C(X) = [(X, it follows that R'( Y) = K. Thus, this is the case when the foreign
subsidiary incurs a net marginal loss from importing (R'( Y) < p(1 + T)). Exports are
higher under the tax deduction system in this case since the double taxation of foreign
source income makes it profitable to reduce taxable income abroad as much as possible.
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The main lesson from this example, however, cannot be carried over to the general case
since it can be shown that its simplicity depends on the assumption of constant
marginal costs in the foreign country.s. Moreover, the specific result above is reversed
when K> p(l + T) and the subsidiary derives a net marginal gain from importing. We
can, then, conclude that which tax scheme implies the highest degree of profit shifting
from the foreign country to the home country is ambiguous and depends on revenue
and cost considerations as well as the relative size of tax parameters. This result is
rather surprising since it suggests that the total out come on exports of any tax scheme
is much more complicated than what one may be lead to believe by simply examining
the plain algebra of any tax system. Of course, this is due to the complicated
environment surrounding the firm.
6. The E//ecU;o/Tax Policy
In this section we compare the effects of government policies under the tax credit
system and the tax deduction system. This section is organized as follows. First, we
examine the effects of domestic tax policy. Then, we move on to study the impact of a
change in the foreign corporate rate of tax. Finally, foreign trade policy is analyzed.
Domestic Tax Policy. Differentiating the first order conditions pertaining to the tax
deduction case, we obtain?
The Tax Deduction System:
ox ex oz !lJL oyOl = Of = Ol = ot = Of = o. (24)
8The reader can convince himself of this by replacing the cost function C(X) = KX by the cost
function C(X) = 2X2. Which system implies the highest level of exports will then depend on cost
and revenue parameters as well as the relative size of tax parameters.
9The differentiation is done in appendix B.
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Equation (24) states that a change in the domestic rate of tax does not influence
production, sales and export levels in either country. The mechanism at work can be
understood by examining the first order conditions (ll), (12) and (13). Such an
examination reveals that neither exports nor production are sensitive to changes in the
domestic rate of tax. We can, then, conclude that the tax deduction scheme is neutral
with respect to changes in the domestic corporate tax. From a strategic point of view,
however, the tax deduction system induces a fiscal externality on the home country.
The fiscal externality - as will be shown below - occurs since intra-firm trade,
production and sales are affected by foreign tax policy under the tax deduction system.
The foreign country, therefore, can set its tax rates without having to take into
- consideration strategic responses by the home country.
Turning to the tax credit case we study the comparative static results of a change in
the domestic rate of tax by differentiating equations (7 - 9)10
The Tax Credit System:
¥t = tJ(1- t)(l - T)1"'(R" - G')(p - 1"') {< O if (p - 1"') > O> O if (p - 1"') < O. (25)
Jf = - #1 - t)(l - T)R"(1'" - c")(p - 1"') {> O if (p - 1"') > O< O if (p - r') < O. (26)
!l {< O if (p - r') > OFt = #1 - t)(l - T)(R" - G')( 1'" - c")(p - 1"')
> O if (p - 1"') < O.
(27)
fit = itl - t)(l - T)(R" - G')(p - 1"')c" [
> O if (p - r') > O
= O if c'' = O
< O if (p - r') < O.
(28)
10The derivations are done in appendix A.
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%f = h(1- t)(l- T)(r" - C")(p - r')(- C') !
<O if (p - r,') > O
= O if C' = O
> O if (p - r') < O.
(29)
where His the Hessian determinant (H < O).
The neutrality of the tax deduction system contrasts sharply to the results under the
tax credit system. From equations (25 - 29), we see that domestic tax policy has real
effects. The effects depend on whether the parent firm equates its net marginal gain
from exporting to the net marginal loss by the foreign subsidiary from importing or
vice versa.u In the following we will discuss the comparative static results under these
two scenarios.
(i) Net Marginal Gain From Exporting. An increase in the domestic rate of tax lowers
the gain from exporting and makes the parent firm reduce the level of exports
(az/ at < O). The fall in exports means that for a given level of production, more can be
sold domestically and less abroad. The change in exports, therefore, necessitates an
adjustment in production levels for marginal revenue to equal marginal costs. At home,
the increase in sales lower marginal revenue below marginal costs while abroad, the
situation is just the opposite. Thus, domestic production falls (ax/ at < O) and foreign
production increases (ax/at> O). Note that change in exports affects only marginal
revenue while a change in production also affects marginal costs. If marginal costs are
increasing, the fall in exports must exceed the change in production. As a result,
llRestating the first order condition for exports, equation (9), we have that
(1 - t)(p - r') + (1 - T)(R' - p(1 + T)) = O.
ABseen from this equation if the first term is positive, (p - r') > 0, that is, the parent firm derives a
net marginal gain from exports, then the second term must be negative, (R' - p(1 + T)) < 0, for the
first order condition to hold (and vice versa). The second term indicates the net marginal loss (gain)
by the foreign subsidiary from importing.
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domestic sales increase (By/ Bt > O) and foreign sales decrease (By/åt < O). A special
ease occurs when marginal costs are constant. A change in exports are now exactly
offset by the change in production and sales are unaffected.
(ii) Net Marginal Loss From Exporting. The results above are now reversed. Since the
firm derives a net loss from exporting, an increase in the domestic rate of tax reduces
the loss from exporting. The firm, therefore, wants to expand its exports (Bz/ Bt > O).
The increase in exports means that for a given level of production, domestic sales
decrease and foreign sales increase. By the same mechanism as outlined above, it now
follows that domestic production increases (Bx/ Bt > O) and foreign decreases
(BX/ Bt < O). As previously - since marginal costs are increasing - the change in
production levels is less than the increase in exports. Thus, domestic sales decrease
(By/ åt < O) and foreign sales increase (BY/ Bt > O). Obviously, the case of constant
marginal costs is still valid and implies that sales are unaffected by domestic tax
policy.
To conclude, then, the impact of domestic tax policy under the tax credit system
differs according to whether the multinational firm derives a marginal net gain or loss
from exporting. It seems reasonable to argue that knowledge about the first order
condition for exports is private to the firm. If this is true, the home country
government cannot identify the sign or magnitude of the effects of its tax policy.
The Foreign Corporate Tax. Turning to the effects of foreign tax policy under the two
tax systems, the comparative static results indicate that the direction of change is the
same under each tax system but that the size of the effects may dlffer.P Again, we must
examine the comparative static results under two different scenarios, depending on
whether the firm equates the gain from exporting to the loss from importing or vice
12Seeappendix A and B for the calculation of the comparative static results.
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versa. The general directions of change under both tax systems are as follows
ax {> Oif (R' - p(1 + T)) < O
7fl' < o if (R' - p(1 + T)) > O.
(30)
ax {< O if (R' - p(1 + T)) < O
7fl' > o if (R' - p(1 + T)) > O.
(31)
az {> O if (R' - p(1 + T)) < O
7fl' < o if (R' - p(1 + T)) > O.
(32)
«
O if (R' - p(1 + T)) < O* = o if c" = O
> O if (R' - p(1 + T)) > O.
(33)
(
> O if (R' - p(1 + T)) < O
ay = O if Gli = O
7fl'
< O if (R' - p(1 + T)) > o.
(34)
(i) Net Marginal Gain From Exporting. The increase in the foreign rate of tax reduces
the cost of importing and, hence, makes it more profitable to expand exports
(az/ar> O). Accordingly, domestic production increases (ax/ar> O)but by less than
exports due to increasing marginal costs. Thus, domestic sales decrease (ay/ ar> O).
The expansion of exports increases sales abroad and, therefore, decreases marginal
revenue below marginal costs. For the first order condition for production to hold,
foreign production must decrease (ax/ ar < O). As previously, the decline is less than
the increase in exports so that foreign sales increase (ay/ ar> O). Again, if marginal
costs are constant, sales in both countries are unaffected by tax policy.
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(i) Net Marginal Loss From Exporting. Again, the results are reversed. The firm now
derives a net gain from importing. However, the tax increase lowers the gain from
importing and, thus, leads to a reduction in exports (åzl åT < O). Following the
reasoning above, domestic production decreases (oxl oT < O), foreign production
increases (åX} oT > O), domestic sales increase (åyI oT > O), and foreign sales decrease
iovtor < O).
To summarize, then, unless the foreign tax authorities has private information about
the firm, it is in an equally weak position as the home country in terms of predicting
the effect of its tax policy on the behavior of the multinational firm.
Foreign Trade Policy. The effects of trade policy are the same under both tax schemes
although the magnitude of the effects may differ. An increase in the ad valorem tariff
increases the cost of importing the good or decreases the gain from importing it. In
either case, exports decline (åzl år < O), and trade policy by the foreign country has an
unambiguous effect on exports. As previously, the decline in exports alters marginal
revenues and leads to a fall in domestic production (oxl år < O) and an increase foreign
production (oXI år> O). The relative change in production and exports implies - by
the same mechanism as above - that domestic sales increase (oyI or> O) and foreign
sales fall (oYI år < O).
Two striking insights emerge from these results. First, trade policy by the foreign
country is a very potent policy tool. The foreign country can identify the sign and
magnitude of the effects of its tax policy without relying on information about the
firm's first order condition for exports. Second, lacking information about the firm, the
clarity of trade policy means that the foreign country gains the upper hand in any
tax-setting game irrespective of tax scheme in place. This result is quite strong and
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depends on the assumption that we have one importing and one exporting country
where only the importing country can use trade policy as a strategic tool.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have examined how different ways of alleviating international double taxation
affects production decisions and intra-firm trade by a multinational firm. An
important result - emerging from a numerical example - is that the tax deduction
scheme by imposing double taxation on foreign source income, does not necessarily
yield an anti trade bias and, thus, reduce tax arbitrage. The analysis shows - contrary
to popular belief - that results are indeterminate.
Another result of the paper is that under the tax deduction system, domestic tax policy
does not affect the behavior of the multinational firm, only foreign tax policy does. In
contrast, under the tax credit system, both domestic and foreign tax policy have real
effects. The neutrality of the tax deduction scheme induces a fiscal externality on the
home country as opposed to the tax credit scheme since the former allows the foreign
country to solely influence the profit shifting behavior of the firm.
The paper finds that when tax policy has real effects, its impact depends on the first
order condition for trade between the parent firm and its foreign subsidiary. Lacking
this knowledge, governments cannot identify the sign or magnitude of the effects of its
tax policy. This is in stark contrast to the effects of trade policy. By changing its ad
valorem tariff, the foreign country can predict the behavior of the firm unambiguously.
The implication of this result is that trade policy is a superior policy tool. It gives the
foreign country the upper hand in any tax game played by the two countries
irrespective of the tax scheme in place. Obviously, this conclusion is reached in a model
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with one exporting and one importing firm. An interesting expansion of the model
would be to include more than one traded good. In such a setting each country could be
made to import at least one good. This leads to a more complicated pattern of trade in
which the tax-setting game is not as easily determined.
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Appendix A
Tax Credit Case:
Differentiating (7), (8) and (9), we obtain
(Al)
[
(1-'- t)~r' - e")
- (1 - t)r'
O
(1 - T)(R" - G')
(1 - T)R"
- (1 - t) ril l [d x l [O l(1 - T) Ril dX = O
(1 - t)r' + (1 - T)R" d z D
where D :: [p - r'(y)]dt + [R'(S) - p(l + r)]dT + [(1 + T)(l - T) - (1 - t)]dp
+ (1 - T)pdT.
dz =1(1 - t)(l - T)r'(R" - G')D.
dX = -1(1 - t)(l - T)(r' - e")R"D.
dz =1{l- t)(l - T)(r' - e")(R" -G')D.
Note that H is the determinant to the matrix on the left hand side of (AI). It follows
from the second order conditions that H < O.
H= - (1- t)2(1- T)(R" - G')r'e" - (1- t)(r' - e")(l- T)2R"G' < O.
If (r" - c") < O, (Ril - G') < O, (r", Ril) < O, and (c", G') > O, H will always be
negative and a maximum is assured.
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The change in production and export levels when the tax parameters change are
~~ = #1 - t)(l - T)r"(R" - G')(p - r').
~ = #1 - t)(l - T)r'(R" - G')(R' - p(l + T)).
~ = #1 - t)(l - T)r'(R" - G')(l- T)p.
£f = - #1 - t)(l - T)R"(r' - e")(p - r').
~ = - #1 - t)(l - T)R"(r' - e")(R'- p(l + T».
~ = - #1 - t)(l - T)R"(r' - e")(l - T)p.
~: = #1 - t)(l - T)(R" - G')( r" - e")(p - 1").
*= #1 - t)(l - T)(R" - G')(r' - e")(R'- p(l + T)).
~ = #1 - t)(l - T)(R" - G')(1'" - e")(l - T)p.
~ = ¥t-¥t = #1- t)(l- T)(R" - G')(p - 1")e".
*= tT-*= #1- t)(l- T)(R" - G')(R'- p(l + T))e".
~ = ~-~ = #1- t)(l- T)2p(R" - G')e".
~ = £f - ¥t = #1 - t)(l - T)( 1'" - e")(p - r')(- G').
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dY dX dz 1dT= dT+ ar= h(1- t)(l- T)(R'- p(l + T))(1''' - c")(- GI).
dY dX dz 1d T = d T + dT = h(1- t)(l - T)2(r'1 - c")p(- GI).
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AppendixB
Tax Deduction Case;
Differentiating (11), (12) and (13)
(Bl)
[
(r'I -Oe")
- r"
O
(1 - 1) ( Ril - Cl)
(1- T) Ril
- ril l [d x l [O l(1 - T) Ril dX = O
r" + (1 - 1)Ril d z G
where G = [R'(S) - p(l + T)]dT + [(1 + T)(l - 1) - 1]dp + (1 - 1)pdT.
dx =1(1 - 1)r'I(R" - CI)G.
dX = -1(1 - 1)( r" - c")R"G.
dz =1(1 - 1)(r'I - c")(R" - CI)G.
The number E denotes the determinant to the matrix on the left hand side of (Bl) and
is negative from the second order conditions to the maximization problem.
E= - (1- 1)(R" - CI)r'IC" - (1-1)2(r" - c")R"C' < O.
For a discussion of the second order condition see appendix A.
The change in production and export levels when the tax parameters change are
dx<IT = o.
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~~ = ~1 - T)r"(R" - CI)(R' - p(l + r)).
~~ = ~1 - T)1"I(R" - CI)(l - T)p.
dXn=O.
dX 1dT = - 'k(1- T)R"(1"I - c")(R'- p(l + r)).
~~ = - ~1 - T)R"( 1"1- c")(l - T)p.
dz
dt = O.
*= ~1 - T)(R" - CI)(1"I - c")(R'- p(l + r)).
~ = ~1 - T)(R" - CI)(1"I - c")(l - T)p.
Q..u - d x d z - .Lr1 T)(R" CI)(R' (1 )) IldT- (fT-dT- b" - - - p + re.
Qu = dx _ dz = 1fI_ T)2 (Ril - Cl) Ildr dr dr l!." P c .
dY dX dz 1
(fT= (fT+ dT= 'E(1- T)(R'- p(l + r))(r'I - c")(- Cl).
~ = ~ + ~ = ~1- T)2(r'I - c")p(- Cl).
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